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This research explores a viable solution to the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC) 
communications gap at the tactical edge. The aim is to leverage commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) technology to provide a combat operations center (COC) like 
communication architecture to small units operating in austere environments. 
The proposed architecture required must be lightweight, energy efficient, and 
allow greater mobility through a reduced footprint and energy consumption. By 
reducing the energy required for unit communications, this theoretical 
architecture decreases fuel needs, leading to a reduction in logistical-supply 
requirements.  
The emergency operational center (EOC) architectural concept is 
examined as an example of virtualized technology to determine how such an 
architecture might satisfy USMC requirements. Server virtualization, hastily 
formed networks, the functionality of software and hardware in a virtual 
environment, and the original concept of the EOC architecture are explored. 
Expeditionary considerations and Marine Air Ground Task Force command-and-
control (C2) characteristics are also considered, along with current 
communication architectures, comparing capabilities, weight, and power 
consumption to determine a baseline for future C2 technology. Finally, the 
interoperability and security of the EOC are discussed in relation to software and 
hardware used by the USMC.  
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A. EXPEDITIONARY MOBILE-OPERATIONS CENTER (EMOC) 
The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) operates in austere environments 
throughout the world and must communicate using organic assets. Each element 
must be able to communicate at the tactical edge. Current efforts to 
communicate within the tactical edge remain difficult because of marginal 
technology in the areas of voice and data communication, mobility, and energy 
efficiency.  
The USMC has identified deficiencies in its communication systems and 
seeks ways to increase the reliability of voice and data transmission, enhance 
mobility, and exploit alternative-energy sources, thus simplifying logistics for 
forward-deployed units. Units in battle must be able to set up and expand 
networks rapidly, especially when required to engage, pack up immediately, and 
move to another position. Units operating a forward combat operations center 
(COC) with a small ad-hoc network also require reliable, portable, and energy-
thrifty systems. The military’s current equipment set makes it difficult for these 
small units to move quickly while maintaining the full communication capabilities 
of the main COC, and capability is often sacrificed to maneuverability.  
During a deployment to Afghanistan in 2010, while traveling to a number 
of small Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) occupied by platoon-size elements, 
we observed that the communications of these small units were limited to voice 
and data messaging (text messaging via VHF single-channel radio). These 
constraints might be mitigated under today’s technology. The USMC’s directives 
for cloud computing calls for FOB support as follows:  
• Facilitate secure communications and IT services that provide robust, 
near-real-time access to mission-critical data, information, and 
knowledge.  
• Provide a net-centric information environment that enables access to 
rear echelon data resources at the battalion level and below. 
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• Enable dispersed operations in a non-linear battle space over greater 
distances by providing more information with fewer deployed 
resources. 
• Implement virtualization technologies to reduce footprint and energy 
requirements and increase the speed of network implementation 
(Anderson, 2012, p. 4). 
With the advent of virtual machines and wireless technologies, it is 
possible for small units operating in a FOB miles from headquarters or Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) in austere environments to capitalize on all COC 
communications capabilities while maintaining maneuverability and meeting the 
USMC’s vision of cloud-computing support of forward-operating units. In addition, 
with the incorporation of virtual machines, section leaders and commanders can 
potentially leave the COC and still pull or push information to higher 
headquarters. Wireless technology can potentially enable units to maneuver 
within an area and still connect to their network. This research shows how 
reengineering the Naval Postgraduate School’s emergency operations center 
(EOC) “in-a-box” architecture would allow the military to take advantage of a 
communication system that integrates virtual-machine technology into a hastily 
formed network to support military operations. The reengineering of the EOC-in-
a-box is dubbed the expeditionary mobile operations center (EMOC). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The following questions are explored in this research.  
1. How can the current EOC-in-a-box architecture be modified to 
reduce weight, improve maneuverability, and still provide the 
security and C2 capabilities needed to bridge the communications 
gap? 
2. How can the EOC-in-a-box’s energy-efficiency plan be modified to 
reduce the logistical burden associated with C2? 
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C. BENEFITS 
After over a decade of fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan, the USMC is 
determined to return to its expeditionary roots by enhancing C2 capabilities from 
the headquarters level down to the smallest units. To transition from a force 
accustomed to maintaining a large footprint on the battlefield to one that can 
maneuver swiftly without losing C2 capabilities, the USMC needs to exploit 
today’s commercial technology.  
New technologies can allow the USMC to continue operating in austere 
environments without sacrificing C2 capabilities, by reducing unit dependency on 
fossil fuels and lightening the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)—
improving maneuverability and communications at all levels while supporting its 
ability to function in the irregular-warfare environment. The use of virtual 
machines is extremely promising toward this progress. By reducing the size, 
weight, and fuel consumption of communication assets for the USMC, virtual 
machines could render units more maneuverable and less dependent on fuel, 
and the logistical support that goes with it, thus making the USMC more 
expeditionary and closing the communications gap identified.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This research evaluates current and developing communications systems 
that incorporate virtual-machine technology to evaluate the feasibility of 
deploying virtualized technology to the tactical edge. These evaluations are 
based on quantitative data measuring weight, power consumption, and 
compatibility with current USMC software and hardware.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
1. Chapter II: Technology and Definitions 
Chapter II provides a general understanding of the background, 
fundamentals, and capabilities of leveraging virtualization technology in mobile 
command-and-control in austere environments. It introduces server virtualization, 
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hastily formed networks (HFN), how software and hardware function in a virtual 
environment, and the original EOC concept.  
2. Chapter III: Current USMC C2 Technology 
Chapter III provides information on expeditionary considerations and 
MAGTF C2 characteristics, analyzing current and developing Marine Corps 
communication architectures and comparing their capabilities, weight, and power 
consumption to determine a baseline for future C2 technology. 
3. Chapter IV: Analysis and Application 
The interoperability and security of the EOC in relation to specific software 
and hardware used by the USMC is addressed in Chapter IV. Experiments are 
conducted on the original and follow-up EOC model and an EMOC model is 
proposed to fill communication gaps. 
4. Chapter V: Conclusion and Recommendations  
Chapter V examines findings according to the research questions posed in 
Chapter I, which are broken down and answered based on the information 




II. BACKGROUND TECHNOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIONS 
A. BACKGROUND  
Communication is imperative in combat, and equally important with the 
need to share information among troops and allies is the need for operational 
secrecy. Thus, it is important to maintain alternative lines of communication and 
networks among government forces and allies. In recent years, the convergence 
of data, voice, and multimedia over the network, coupled with continual 
improvement in network capacity and reliability, has supported a wide range of 
communication applications. Examples range from general-purpose 
communication, such as voice-over-Internet protocol (VoIP) telephony and video, 
to other networks, such as the non-classified Internet protocol router network 
(NIPRNET), secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET), combined 
enterprise regional information exchange (CENTRIX), and the NATO secret 
network.  
Through its Science and Technology Strategic Plan (S&TSP) (2012), the 
USMC has established priorities for promoting new technologies, based on the 
USMC expeditionary maneuver warfare (EMW) capabilities list and subsequent 
solutions-planning directive, which aimed at closing the capability gaps identified 
in the EMW, including communications gaps. Improving voice and data 
communication, enhancing command mobility, and reducing the logistical 
requirements associated with supporting a COC, while at the same time 
maintaining the ability to communicate over different networks have been 
designated a priority (USMC, 2012). Lacking these capabilities, it is difficult for 
commanders to communicate to adjacent and subordinate units and maneuver 
their forces in the area of operations (AO).  
The current requirements by which units communicate with higher and 
coalition forces have meant that they must use different physical machines, each 
with a special network configuration. The result is a large logistical-support 
burden; and as supply convoys dispatch to subordinate units, service members 
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come under increased threat from the enemy. The Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC) has tasked investments in C2, via the 2012 S&TSP. The focus is 
on three areas required to implement the MAGTF C2 plan: communications and 
networking systems to enable data exchange with and among distributed tactical 
forces; decision-support systems; and effective combat identification of enemy 
combatants, friendly forces, and non-combatants.  
B. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER IN A BOX  
Leveraging the original EOC-in-a-box platform (referred to as “EOC” 
hereafter), units can potentially increase communications while simultaneously 
reducing their footprint and power requirements, affording increased mobility 
without sacrificing capability. The EOC is a communications-command center 
that uses virtual-machines (VMs) to satisfy the vast majority of its network-
communications requirements. It currently operates within the Monterey County 
government (Barreto, 2011) in Monterey California and provides the county with 
a small, lightweight virtual network to cover their network needs. It is available as 
a backup in case of a natural disaster to provide the county with a mirrored 
alternative to its current networking—in effect, an ad-hoc HFN ready to go when 
the county network fails due to unforeseen circumstances. 
1. Hastily Formed Networks 
HFNs (Denning, 2006) and virtualization are two distinct models that have 
been merged to form a system of systems (SoS) comprising power sources, 
communications, and a mobile EOC. The present EOC, as defined by Barreto 
(2011), and the HFN (Denning, 2006) have deployed with NPS faculty and 
Monterey-area fire-and-rescue agencies to such locations as New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and Haiti. They have provided ad-hoc networking for disaster-relief 
workers, emergency responders, and civilians. Technological capabilities include 
radio communications, Internet access, and Internet-protocol (IP) (Postel, 1981) 
telephones, to name a few. Barreto (2011) enabled the system to access 
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applications and data that users find important to their missions and cannot 
access with a web browser.  
Denning (2006) defines an HFN as exhibiting five characteristics: 
1. A network of people, established rapidly  
2. From different communities 
3. Working together in a shared conversation space  
4. In which they plan, commit to, and execute actions 
5. To fulfill a large, urgent mission 
The shared conversation space created in the HFN model is the area that 
most stands to benefit from virtualization. 
Virtualization is a technique that allows the abstraction of multiple 
computers and applications from a single computer or application. Under 
virtualization, all the advances in hardware and software technologies can be 
made to converge and operate seamlessly. Introducing virtualization 
technologies into the HFN architecture yields a robust EOC with virtualized 
servers, desktops, and applications augmenting existing HFN power and 
communications systems.  
This research examines the degree to which the communications gap 
identified in the USMC S&TSP can be bridged using EOC concepts. A study of 
the compatibility of the EOC and current USMC software has not previously been 
undertaken. If compatible, EOC concepts can be expected to further the goal of 
expanding battlefield communications while easing the logistical burdens 
associated with a COC. It may also be possible to employ this system in smaller 
units in distant and austere environments, consistent with the USMC strategic 
plan of enhancing company and MAGTF operations while maintaining 
expeditionary maneuver warfare capabilities (USMC, 2012). The problems the 
researcher seeks to address are in the following realms: 
 7 
2. Virtual Machines and Architecture 
Virtualization is the process of building simulations, or virtual versions, of 
infrastructure resources such as computer environments, Operating Systems, 
storage devices, and network components, as opposed to supplying actual, or 
physical, versions of these resources. Thus virtualization results in a lower cost 
and size for a given network. Virtual-machine (VM) computers are commonly 
associated with standalone or client-side computers, where they operate with an 
Operating System (OS) or Internet browser (Venkatesh, Otis, & Bretl, 2001). 
Virtualization has become an important tool in computer design, and VMs are 
used in a number of sub-disciplines, ranging from OSs to processor architectures 
(Smith & Nair, 2005). Virtualization is not a new technology; rather, it is old 
technology repackaged, dating back to the 1990s, when it was primarily used to 
re-create end-user environments on a single mainframe to save on costs while 
testing new software (Ray & Schultz, 2009). There are three basic categories of 
virtualization, distinguished primarily by computing architecture:  
• Storage Combines multiple networked storage devices so they can 
appear as a single storage device. 
• Network Combines computing resources by splitting the available 
bandwidth into independent channels and assigning them to a server 
or device to operate in real-time 
• Server Hides the physical nature of server resources and provides a 
virtual version with all server resources incorporated. This includes 
hiding the number and identity of individual servers, processors, and 
OSs from the software running them. 
Server virtualization, the most common kind, is the primary driver of this 
technology and what most people mean by “virtualization” (Ray & Schultz, 2009).  
VMs can operate in conjunction with or on a server computer that serves 
one or more client computers. These clients may be connected to the server 
directly (whether hard lined or wirelessly) or by networked connections. 
Enhancing software interoperability, system impregnability, and platform 
versatility (Smith & Nair, 2005), virtualization is the key technology underlying 
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cloud computing, which is quickly becoming the platform of choice for many 
companies (Szefer, Keller, Lee & Rexford, 2011). Understanding the architecture 
of a VM network is a paramount concern, due to the security risks associated 
with this technology.  
Virtual environments rely on a hypervisor, or virtual-machines monitor 
(VMM), a software layer that lies between the VM and the physical hardware and 
manages how hardware platforms are shared among multiple guest OSs (Azab 
et al., 2010). Simply put, it provides a logical, rather than physical, view of 
computing resources. A guest OS, according to the U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) special publication (SP) 800-125, is an OS 
that is installed on a VM or disk partition in addition to the host, or main OS. The 
guest OS is managed by the VMM, which controls the flow of instructions 
between the guest OS and physical hardware (Scarfone, Souppaya & Hoffman, 
2011). The VMM allocates resources such as main memory and peripherals to 
the VM. It gives each VM the illusion of being run on its own hardware by 
exposing a set of virtual-hardware devices (e.g., CPU, memory, NIC, storage), 
whose tasks are then scheduled on the actual physical hardware (Perez-Botero, 
Szefer & Lee, 2013). This allows a VM to circumvent real-machine compatibility 
and hardware-resource constraints and presents the guest VM with the illusion 
that the OS and applications inside the VM are running directly on some given 
software. There are two variations of the VM architecture: hosted and bare metal. 
Figure 1 depicts these variations. 
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Figure 1.  The architecture on the left depicts the VMM software 
installed on the host OS. The architecture on the right depicts 
the VMM software installed on the hardware and the OS 
installed on the hypervisor (from NIST SP 800-125, 2011).  
a. Hosted and Bare-Metal Architecture 
NIST SP 800-125 (2011) provides a description of hosted and bare-metal 
virtualization (also known as native virtualization). Hosted virtualization runs on 
top of the host OS, which can be almost any common OS (e.g., Windows, Linux, 
Macintosh). Hosted virtualization usually has an additional layer of software 
present running in the guest OS to provide utilities for controlling the virtualization 
from the guest OS, including file sharing, running web browsers, and emailing 
clients alongside the hosted virtualization application. Bare-metal architecture 
does not possess this capability; it can only run applications within the virtual 
system (Scarfone et al., 2011). In this architecture, the VMM runs directly on the 
underlying hardware, without a host OS. This architecture is often used to 
virtualize servers, just as hosted architecture is often used to virtualize desktops. 
Choosing which architecture to employ is an important decision for both 
operational and security reasons, as discussed in Section 5. 
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3. Virtualization of the COC Using the EOC Concept 
Virtualization of the current COC presents manifold opportunities to meet 
USMC communications goals. Some advantages are server consolidation, lower 
energy consumption, faster hardware, expanded networking, maximal efficiency 
(Oh, Lim, Choi, & Ryoo, 2011), ease of adding programs, common access to 
multiple OSs and networks, and increased capabilities. With the potential of 
reducing the physical size of a COC, virtualization raises the prospect of 
providing small combat elements, such as platoons or squads, with functionality 
equal to battalion or regimental COCs—without the hardware requirements and 
accompanying logistical burdens.   
Providing potential benefits beyond the USMC’s communication goals, the 
EOC is a model for conceiving, structuring, synthesizing, and delivering 
sophisticated, tailor-made communications in hours or days, rather than months 
or years. The EOC concept revolves around user-centric, on-demand 
communications. This makes the EOC extremely flexible with various software 
and communication needs and enables the system to adapt to the user, as 
opposed to the user’s adapting to the system.  
In addition, with the use of VMs, the EOC can facilitate seamless 
information sharing down to the platform level and enable the integration of 
unclassified and classified systems for joint and coalition operations, in line with 
the USMC’s strategic plan of 2012. This could enhance the commander’s ability 
to pull information from higher or outside sources and save on data storage by 
tapping into the Internet or a cloud.   
4. Cloud Computing (Portable, Private Clouds) 
Cloud computing is not a single, unitary thing. There is no “the cloud”, or a 
clear difference between the cloud and the Internet itself (Ryan, Falvey & 
Merchant, 2013). The concept of cloud computing dates back to 1953, with 
Herbert Grosch’s theory that computing performance would increase by the 
square of its cost and that relatively dumb terminals would tap into the power of 
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large data centers (Gorsch, 1953). Since the early 1990s, there has been an 
effort to legally define the meaning of “cloud computing”. The term originated with 
Compaq marketing executive George Favaloro in 1996 (Ryan et al., 2013), who 
described a trend toward more intra- and intercompany connectivity, e-
commerce, and use of the Internet as an information source (Regalado, 2011). 
While there is no official definition, computing researchers and 
practitioners have defined “cloud” in various ways. Buyya, Yeo, and Venugopal 
(2008), assert that a cloud is a type of parallel, distributed system consisting of a 
collection of interconnected and virtualized computers, dynamically provisioned 
and presented as one or more unified computing resource, based on service-
level agreements established through negotiation between a service provider and 
customer.  
With the rising popularity and evolving paradigm of cloud computing, the 
NIST in 2011 defined “cloud computing” as  
A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. 
networks, servers, storage, application and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service-provider interaction. (Mell & Grance, 2011, p. 2) 
NIST SP 800-145 organized the cloud model according to five essential 
characteristics (on-demand, self-service; broad network access; resource 
pooling; rapid elasticity; and measured service), three service models (software, 
platform, and infrastructure), and four cloud-deployment models (private, 
community, public, and hybrid) (Mell & Grance, 2011). However, other 
organizations outside of the U.S. offer competing definitions. For this thesis, we 
use the definition established by NIST (2011).  
Cloud-computing services offer the ability to scale computing 
requirements up or down and reduce the cost of deployment. Many organizations 
are migrating to cloud computing services to lower risk, reduce information 
technology (IT) costs, and provide better business continuity (Mandal & Khilar, 
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2013). Cloud computing frees customers of the expense and hassle of installing 
and maintaining applications locally, lowers the cost of application development, 
and makes the process more scalable (Leavitt, 2009) and flexible.  
The Department of Defense (DOD) and federal government have also 
adopted cloud computing in an effort to reduce IT costs. The federal government 
spends billions of dollars annually on IT infrastructure and is shifting to cloud 
computing to maximize the use of those funds under the president’s budget (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010). Since cloud computing is managed by 
an external provider and relies on Internet-based services and resources, it frees 
the customer from the expense of maintaining IT networks (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2010). As the government looks toward cloud computing 
within its garrison IT infrastructure, it envisions cloud computing for the DOD and 
troops in combat, to allow access on demand, regardless of time and location. 
This concept conforms to the DOD Chief Information Officer’s (CIO’s) 
responsibility to address international issues associated with IT and 
communications technologies for the non-automatic movement, transmission, 
and reception of information (Department of Defense, 2005).  
As the DOD CIO states, “Long term planning is essential, but at the same 
time we have to be focused on the individuals on the ground and providing them 
with what they need” (Corrin, 2011, para. 6). One benefit that cloud computing 
offers the DOD is battle-space situational awareness with the common operating 
picture (Kubic, 2008). Accessing the cloud and being able to view the status of 
troops, missions, weapons, and supplies, as well as tactical intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds from anywhere in the world, can 
give the strategic and tactical warfighter the resources necessary to prevail 
(Kubic, 2008).  
DOD missions can be unpredictable and range from large-scale strategic 
operations to small-scale conflicts in austere environments. With the increased 
reliance on small units and SOF, there is a need for lightweight mobile 
communications assets that are flexible and scalable to the situation and 
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mission. By providing a portable private cloud (PPC), the EOC could improve 
operational and tactical effectiveness for forward-deployed forces by mirroring 
the capabilities of the current COC in a smaller configuration, improving small-
unit maneuverability and enhancing communications capabilities.  
5. Virtualization Security Challenges  
Many organizations are gravitating to virtualization, with estimates 
showing between 60 and 80 percent of IT departments pursing server 
consolidation (Ray & Schultz, 2009) as a way to significantly reduce costs. Yet 
these organizations may be overlooking the security drawbacks associated with 
operating multiple machines on the same physical hardware. Consumers need to 
understand that migrating to a virtual environment does not reduce vulnerabilities 
and threats. If a service with inherent vulnerabilities is moved from a non-
virtualized server to a virtualized server, it remains vulnerable to exploitation, 
according to NIST SP 800-125.  
While in principle, migrating to a virtual environment will produce some 
benefits, it also adds vulnerabilities and threats. These threats and vulnerabilities 
include exploitable weaknesses in virtualization software, the existence of covert 
channels, and the possibility of new types of malware (van Cleeff, Pieters, & 
Wieringa, 2009), as well as hyperjacking and virtual-machine jumping. These 
weaknesses can prove costly in the event of an attack. Identifying vulnerabilities 
and protecting the triad of infrastructure confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA) is especially vital in the DOD.   
Many of the features of virtualization offer both benefits and 
disadvantages in the realm of security (Scarfone et al., 2011). As a whole, 
virtualization improves availability, but threatens confidentiality and integrity, even 
though many features are designed with these goals in mind. A number of 
threats to virtualization have been recognized and addressed and some can be 
mitigated. As asserted by Ray and Schultz (2004), VMs can be used to isolate 
processes from attackers and malware, making systems and applications more 
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difficult to attack or infect. Secure isolation, that is, confining a program to a 
virtual environment, is a basic concept in virtualization, and should guarantee 
that any action performed inside the VM cannot interfere with the system that 
hosts it (Ray & Schultz, 2004). Once again, the physical host server must have a 
proper security protocol in place; if compromised, all the VMs and applications on 
the host server will be affected.  
Since the security of a virtual network depends on the individual security 
of each component, organizations should secure all these elements. With the 
assumption that the physical host OS, guest OS, applications, and storage have 
proper security protocols implemented, this research focuses on the critical 
vulnerability of virtualization: an attack on the VMM.  
The programs that control the VMM should be secured using methods 
similar to those used for other software on desktops and servers, according to 
NIST SP 800-125. Scarfone et al., (2011) agree that the critical vulnerability of 
the virtual infrastructure depends on the security of the virtualization 
management system (VMS) that controls the VMM and allows the operator to 
start guest OSs, create new guest OS images, and perform other actions. Due to 
security implications, access to the VMS must be restricted to authorize 
personnel only. Securing each VMM interface and limiting access to the VMM is 
critical to the security of the entire system (Scarfone et al., 2011).  
An attack on the virtualization infrastructure via the VMM can cause 
serious damage to a VM, because the VMM has more access to hardware 
resources than typical applications do. Two primary attacks are explored in this 
thesis: hyperjacking and virtual-machine jumping. 
a. Hyperjacking 
By creating and inserting a thin hypervisor into the virtualization system, 
an attacker can take control of the underlying OS. Traditional security measures 
are ineffective against this threat, because the OS, which runs above the VMM, 
is not aware that the machine has been attacked. 
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b. Virtual-Machine Jumping 
Virtual-machine jumping exploits vulnerabilities in the VMM that enable 
malware or a remote attacker to compromise VM protections and gain access to 
other VMs, or even the VMM itself.  
These attacks are often conducted once an attacker has gained access to 
a weakly secured virtual-machine. An example of hyperjacking is a software 
called Blue Pill Rootkit (Perez & van Doorn, 2008), developed by Joanna 
Rutkowska, which evades all detection from system administrators and allows its 
toolkit to take control of the OS (Oh et al., 2011). Since the hypervisor has 
frequent interaction with the guest VM, a malicious VM can use it to hyperjack 
the hypervisor or implement a virtual-machine jump. Either attack can give the 
attacker access to the hypervisor. Once the attacker has access, he can access 
all VMs attached to the hypervisor without detection. From there, the attacker can 
exploit the virtualization software, gaining the ability to obstruct or access other 
VMs and thus breaching the CIA triad (Szefer et al., 2011).  
6. Software Compatibility  
EOC components and current virtual capabilities allow software to be 
stored on the device, which allows users to operate with the system. However, 
the EOC system has not been tested for compatibility with current and possible 
USMC Tactical Data Systems (TDS), listed in Appendix A, or the COC tactical 
software also known as Joint Tactical Common Workstation (JTCW), listed in 
Appendix E. 
7. Energy Requirements/Reduction Possibilities  
In the past 10 years, the USMC’s consumption of energy on the battlefield 
has increased exponentially, driven by new and powerful war-fighting capabilities 
that have made the USMC dependent on logistical trains, which are exposed to 
risks. Currently, the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), which is the 
workhorse of the USMC logistical trains, consumes 50 percent of all fuels used 
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by USMC vehicles on the battlefield (Goodman, 2010). Combine this with the fact 
that power consumption in information and communication technology is ten 
percent of the total energy consumed in industrial countries (Ghaziseedi, Wang & 
Tafazolli, 2012), tends to lend additional fuel requirements on the USMC.  The 
USMC has realized this and is focusing efforts toward reducing fuel consumption, 
as stated in the USMC S&TSP (2012). The CMC has described the Corps’ 
energy priorities with the following statement: 
The current and future operating environment requires an 
expeditionary mindset geared towards increased efficiency and 
reduced consumption, which will make out forces lighter and faster. 
We will aggressively pursue innovative solutions to reduce energy 
demand in our platforms and systems, to increase out self-
sufficiency in our sustainment and reduce our expeditionary 
footprint on the battlefield. Transforming the way we use energy is 
essential to rebalance our Corps and prepare it for the future. (35th 
Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 2010, p. 3) 
The USMC Expeditionary Energy Strategy (2012) is aimed at increasing 
energy performance, efficiency, and self-sufficiency and reducing logistical 
vulnerabilities, to yield a lighter, more maneuverable, enhanced MAGTF 
operations-capable force (2012 USMC S&TSP).  
8. Mobility 
Provision of “on the move” (OTM) capabilities has become essential in 
tactical networks as the paradigm shifts to network-centric warfare (NCW). The 
need for maintaining expeditionary requirements without sacrificing capability is 
highlighted in the USMC S&TSP (2012).  The intent is to improve mobility for the 
entire MAGTF while reducing logistical footprints and fuel consumption. The 
USMC Installation and Logistics Roadmap (2013) characterizes expeditionary 
logistics as: 
• Lighter, modular, more energy efficient 
• Responsive, reliable, scalable, and timely 
• Supporting MAGTF fires, maneuvers, and force protection 
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• Leveraging technology to improve logistical capabilities, capacity, and 
interoperability 
• Providing MAGTF C2 capability to deployment and distribution 
operations 
• Creating an information network that transmits information and 
services via assured end-to-end connectivity  
The EOC can potentially satisfy this vision while at the same time 
providing a PPC, with the potential to improve operational, logistical, and tactical 
communications for forward-deployed forces by mirroring COCs in a smaller 
configuration. This sizing down theoretically allows a platoon or smaller SOF unit, 
operating in a stationary position for a brief or prolonged period, to employ an 
EOC with little effect on maneuverability—contrasting dramatically with the 
hampering effects of a hardware-reliant COC. The unit would be able to relocate 
quickly and save fuel while still enjoying full communications. However, in judging 
the EOC as a plausible option, overall weight is a significant consideration.  
Since lift and lift-and-carry (L-L&C) are the most frequently performed 
physically demanding tasks in the military (Sharp, Rosenberger & Knapik, 2009), 
careful consideration must be taken in redesigning the existing EOC as not to 
add more weight for the members of a small or SOF unit to deal with. U.S. 
Military Standard 1472 F (1989) gives 79kg/174-lbs as the recommended limit for 
a two-man team lifting from floor level to 91cm/35.8-in. The standard 
recommends doubling the one-man load (39.5kg/87-lbs.) for a two-man L-L&C. 
While this standard is rarely followed when developing new gear, due to time 
restraints and the need to deploy the gear rapidly, it is adopted in this study.    
In austere environments, the USMC deploys small units forward of its 
main battalions (BNs) or headquarters (HQs) to establish and maintain FOBs or 
combat outpost (COP) positions for defensive and offensive tasks. These 
locations usually have little communications capability—in most cases, only an 
Army/Navy 117F multiband man-pack portable radio (AN/PRC) that operates on 
the very high-frequency (VHF) range. These radio systems provide half-duplex 
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voice communication and limited text messaging to the BN or HQ. Some 
elements may also be provided with a broadband global-area network (BGAN).  
a. Broadband Global-Area Network  
The BGAN system is a small satellite terminal and a laptop computer, as 
shown in Figure 2. The BGAN system allows the unit to access a satellite 
connection and provides limited data capabilities to communicate and share 
information with higher and adjacent units. The BGAN is limited to the capability 
of the laptop and the terminal data rate, which is normally 432 kpbs (Inmarsat, 
2013). Owing to the cost and limited number of satellite channels, not all units 
are provided with this capability, and those who have it are limited by capabilities 
of the device used as a medium (the laptop). Moreover, the laptop can 
communicate outside the COP or FOB only, and does not allow communication 
within. This can create a bottleneck of information sharing among the units 
involved. Allowing internal sharing of information would be expected to improve 
efficiency and provide HQ with near-real-time information.  
 
Figure 2.  Small, Class-2 BGAN terminal for SATCOM-on-the-quick-halt 
(SOQH) at the dismount level, or fixed-site applications with 
Toughbook (from Inmarsat, 2013). 
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C. THE EOC  
The EOC is built as a mobile device for local and state emergency-service 
organizations, providing a portable network with wireless capabilities to facilitate 
internal and external information sharing. In its current configuration, the EOC is 
not compatible with austere conditions and would require redesign to meet 
USMC size, weight, and power consumption requirements.  
EOC Characteristics 
The EOC as designed consists of eight COTS components (Barreto, 
2011): 
1. A virtual-desktop infrastructure (VDI) This is the core component 
that provides the EOC with 100 solid-state-disk (SSD) drives, 2x1 
gigabits-per-second (Gbps) copper and 2x10 Gbps fiber-network 
adapters, supporting up to 100 virtual desktops. 
2. A hard disk drive (HDD) provides additional storage of up to 
twelve terabytes (TBs).  
3. A CISCO SGE200P switch provides internal communications 
among devices via 24 ports. 
4. A wireless router This is a Cisco WRT 400N wireless 
router/access point that provides internal network service, an IEEE 
802.11n wireless hotspot, and support for two RF radios 
simultaneously. 
5. A keyboard, video monitor, and mouse (KVM) manages the 
VMware system, with a slide-out keyboard and a 19" LCD display. 
6. An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) provides a stable 
backup-power source to prevent sudden power loss and surges.  
7. A power-distribution unit (PDU) provides additional 120volt 
power outlets. 
8. A rack chassis houses the components.  
The current EOC weighs approximately 244 pounds and meets the criteria 
of robustness, energy efficiency, two-man portability and integration with HFN 
systems (Barreto, 2011). These criteria fit with USMC deployable systems; 
 20 
however, the EOC is too heavy for small-unit mobility. This research suggests 
that the EOC configuration can be modified to reduce weight to within 174 
pounds, compliant with the U.S. Military Standard 1472F (1989) for a two-man L-
L&C, which would make it a viable option for small units at the tactical edge.  
a. EOC Overview 
The EOC as described and field tested by Barreto (2011) can meet power 
requirements identified by the CMC. The measured power consumption for the 
EOC was calculated at 550.04 watts per hour (W/h) of power. Figure 3 depicts 
the power consumption of the EOC server, switch, KVM, and SAN, as tested by 
Barreto (2011). 
 
Figure 3.  EOC Component Power Consumption (from Barreto, 2011). 
As tested by Barreto (2011) the EOC can function under its current 
configuration with a minimal amount of fuel. This research suggests that 
additional modifications could further reduce power requirements, making the 
EOC compatible with USMC alternative fuel technologies currently under testing. 
The demand for additional C2 has increased fuel consumption and the 
supply logistics needed. Historically, vehicle electronics systems had a relatively 
low duty cycle (the period in which the electronics draw power from the vehicle, 
relative to the period when they do not). In other words, vehicles were not 
required to be on or powered for very long periods. For example, a vehicle’s 
electrical system (or, for some stationary vehicles, external generators) was used 
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to power vehicle-mounted radios. The radios could be monitored for short 
periods while the engine was off, but the vehicle or generator would have to be 
running to support the radios for longer periods or when the radio was 
transmitting regularly. Today, however, the duty cycle to support the growing 
amount of electronics, sensors, jammers, and communications equipment for 
most military vehicles is fast approaching 100 percent. Engines need to keep 
running almost continuously to power electronic equipment, burning a great deal 
of fuel (Kelly et al., 2011). The need to reduce fuel consumption without 
degrading communications is critical to reducing the costs and casualties 
associated with refueling during combat. 
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III. CURRENT MARINE CORPS C2 TECHNOLOGY 
A. BACKGROUND 
According to USMC Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6, no activity in war is 
more important than C2.  C2 by itself will not guarantee success in a single 
attack against an enemy force or destroy a single enemy target. It will not affect a 
single emergency resupply. Yet none of these essential war-fighting activities, or 
any others, would be possible without effective C2. Without C2, campaigns, 
battles, and organized engagements are impossible, military units degenerate 
into mobs, and the subordination of military force to policy is replaced by random 
violence. C2 is grounded in the tenets of Marine Corps maneuver doctrine and 
has been enforced for generations. When combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan pushed the limits of the Marine Corps’ C2 capabilities, commanders 
began to request assets to close the emerging gaps while engaging the enemy 
rapidly in austere environments. These requests were communicated via 
universal-needs statements (UNS).  
An UNS identifies mission-critical capability gaps and deficiencies (USMC, 
2008). The request is initiated by a combatant-command-level Marine component 
commander, who identifies a war-fighting capability that is critically needed by 
forces conducting combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver on the 
request is likely to prevent units from accomplishing their mission and increases 
the probability of casualty and fatality (MCO 3900.17, 2008).  
This chapter examines combatant-commander (COCOM) requests, made 
during combat operations, to fill the C2 gap. It also discusses current and 
emerging C2 capabilities and infrastructures aimed at closing the C2 gap, and 
explores the concept of pushing communications capabilities to platoon, squad 
and small SOF elements via technology pioneered at NPS and used by first 
responders. This background allows us to consider some real-world applications 
of C2 technology in situations similar to what USMC forces may experience.   
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B. EXPEDITIONARY CONSIDERATIONS 
With the application of modern virtualization technology to the C2 realm, 
the first-responder community (FRC), with the assistance of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, has implemented a C2 structure using COTS technology— 
overcoming inherent limitations to achieve unprecedented coverage, throughput, 
and flexibility in environments with limited or no communications infrastructure. 
This work, leveraging the EOC concept developed by Barreto (2011), offers a 
new model of seamless mobility that has transformed data and voice 
communications for civilian and police responders in natural disasters and other 
settings where instant wireless access offers quality of life and safety benefits. 
Operating in austere environments with limited or no communication 
infrastructure, the FRC has used COTS systems to offer C2 capabilities to 
decision makers, allowing them to coordinate relief efforts. This technology could 
potentially prove applicable to expeditious requirements at the tactical edge, and 
recent work within the FRC could assist USMC efforts in C2 infrastructure and 
capability development.   
To understand why COTS technology is of interest in meeting COCOM 
capability requests, it is necessary to understand that C2 capabilities are critical 
to the USMC for doctrinal reasons. Units must have mobility, swift exchange of 
orders, and fast-flowing information that allows the commander to shape the 
battle space. Commanders must be able to recognize what needs to be done 
and take appropriate, decisive, harmonious, and secure action that raises 
situational awareness (USMC, 2013). All this is encompassed in the MAGTF’s 
version of C2 requirements. 
1. MAGTF C2 Systems Characteristics  
The USMC Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) cites the following 
characteristics of USMC C2 technology: 
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• Common Command echelons use the same equipment. Unique 
MAGTF sensors and intelligence feeds enter via a standard gateway. 
• Modular C2 and communications system are designed to enable 
component utilization that logically supports a variety of configurations 
for various C2 echelons across the MAGTF. 
• Scalable Software and hardware components are added and 
subtracted to facilitate C2 functions for all MAGTF operations centers. 
• Interoperable C2 and communications systems must have the 
interoperability necessary to ensure success in joint and multinational 
operations, as well as interactions with other government agencies 
(OGAs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
• Agile To support expeditionary forces and operational concepts, a 
communications system must be agile. The key dimensions of C2 and 
communications system agility are:  
• Responsive The ability to react in a timely manner to a change 
in the environment. 
• Flexible Able to employ multiple methods to succeed and the 
capacity to move seamlessly between them. 
• Innovative Able to do old things in a new way or simply try new 
things. 
• Adaptable Able to change the organization and work 
processes.  
• Reliable Available when needed and perform as intended with 
low failure rates and few errors. 
• Trusted C2 and communications system users must have confidence 
in the capabilities of the network and the validity of the information 
made available by the network. 
• Shared Sharing allows the mutual use of the information services or 
capabilities among entities of the operational environment. This ability 
may cross-functional or organizational boundaries 
(MARCORSYSCOM, 2012). 
With these characteristics identified, the USMC has focused on providing 
the COCOM with communication assets to complement maneuver doctrine and 
information sharing. With today’s technological advances, it is possible and 
advantageous to leverage military technology with COTS technology to enhance 
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the COCOM’s ability to maneuver throughout the AO while maintaining the 
MAGTF’s C2 requirements.  
The Marine Corps recognizes the trend in evolving information 
needs with in garrison and tactical environments and the need to 
provide an agile method of meeting those needs. (Director for 
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) and the 
Department of the Navy Deputy Chief Information Officer, 
2013, p. 3) 
This strategy emphasizes a focus on the user and the ability to share 
information. Raised situational awareness from information sharing, both in 
garrison and deployed roles, will enable more efficient mission execution 
(Director for Command, Control, Communications, & Computers (C4) and the 
Department of the Navy Deputy Chief Information Officer, 2013).  
Historically, these capabilities satisfied the need for COCOMs and small-
unit leaders who relied primarily upon voice radios, with minimal data capability, 
to receive the commander’s intent and execute missions. While this method of 
voice transmission was adequate in the past, the complexity of the environment 
has changed. As our enemies have become increasingly unconventional and 
attack using asymmetric methods, our small-unit leaders are increasingly relied 
upon to counter them, and they must have better situational awareness (SA), 
bandwidth and network services to do so. In essence, they must be smarter and 
better informed than the enemy. With units dispersed throughout the battlefield, 
there is a need for flexibility and ubiquitous information-sharing to raise SA and 
speed up decision making and mission accomplishment (Director for C4 and the 
Department of the Navy Deputy Chief Information Officer, 2013). All elements 
operating away from their main COC should be able to exploit the rapidly 
changing dynamic in the field and participate in the rapid dissemination of 
information to high, adjacent, and supporting units. Gone are the days of FOB-
centric architecture; the trend is toward a more robust, warfighter-centric model. 
Forward-operating, small-unit Marines require a robust voice and data 
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communication capability. The USMC communications arsenal is lacking in this 
area.  
1. Current Marine Corps Communications Assets 
In keeping with doctrine and evolving battlefield dynamics, the USMC 
seeks a deployable, mobile, flexible, self-contained facility that lets units scale up 
or down their communications equipment depending on the mission, unit size, 
and ability to maintain the tenets of the MAGTF. To achieve this, the USMC has 
looked to both military and civilian industry to develop a system of systems that 
promotes the war-fighting functions (intelligence, maneuver, fires, C2, logistics, 
and force protection) (Director for C4 and the Department of the Navy Deputy 
Chief Information Officer, 2013, p. 3). Many projects are underway to satisfy 
these requirements.  
a. Combat-Operations-Center Capabilities Set 
In 2002, General Dynamics Decision Systems developed the COC-
capability set (CAPSET), by which the COC was designed as the focal point of 
decision making during all phases of ground warfare. This strategy allows Marine 
forces to centralize C2 and digitally collect, process, and disseminate tactical 
data to subordinate, higher and adjacent elements. The COC CAPSET contains 
four variations to accommodate different command levels (e.g., regiment, 
battalion, company) allowing a deployable, self-contained, centralized facility that 




Figure 4.  EOC COC CAPSET Configurations (from Headquarters 
USMC, Combat Development and Integration, 2011). 
All CAPSETs are designed using COTS, to be a mobile, modular C2 
center able to support Marines wherever they deployed. The integrated package 
hosts current mission application software, interfaces to USMC communications 
assets, and leverages organic table-of-equipment (T/E) vehicles for transport to 
the field (Headquarters USMC, Combat Development and Integration, 2011). 
This system provides a low-risk operation center that could:  
• Increase operational capability and mission effectiveness 
• Speed decision making 
• Enhance situational awareness 
MAGTF C2 CAPSETs are a logical grouping of services or capabilities 
that support the organizational structure of the MAGTF and are equipped with a 
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minimal standard basic package, which includes the items shown in figures 4 and 
5.  
The differences between CAPSETs are based on equipment quantity and 
TDS capabilities (Appendix A). The size of a Marine unit dictates the size of the 
CAPSET they operate. CAPSET IV, which is the smallest of the CAPSETs, is 
tailored for elements at the level of BNs, Marine Air Groups (MAGs), and Marine 
Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) (Lawlor, 2004). The USMC Technical Manual 
(TM) 2000-OD/2C (2005) provides the following description of the major 
components and characteristics for the COC CAPSETs IV (see also figures 5 
and 6) and Appendix D provides a list of the CAPSET IV’s IT equipment: 
b. COC Major Components and Characteristics  
CAPSET IV COC displacement relies on two vehicles maintained by the 
owning units.  The vehicles are the model (M) 1152 High Mobility, Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) A2s, which is used as the prime movers. They can 
facilitate the connection of up to 24 external radios, using two digital switching 
units (DSU); antennas can be located up to 2 km away, using fiber-optic cable.  
 
Figure 5.  COC CAPSET IV Technical Characteristics, according to TM 
2000-OD/2C (from USMC TM2000-OD/2C, 2005). 
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Figure 6.  COC CAPSET IV Major Components according to TM 2000-
OD/2C (from USMC TM 2000-OD/2C, 2005). 
The COC is advertised as having transportable C2 capability; however, 
the description should not be interpreted as indicating mobile C2 capabilities. 
This system was designed for ATH C2 and requires a fairly large footprint. It is 
cumbersome to move and logistically burdensome in the expeditionary 
environment, as suggested by the amount of equipment that constitutes the 
CAPSET (see Appendix B for a complete gear list). The term “transportable C2” 
in the context of the COC implies that the COC system is self-contained, can be 
deployed or displaced to various locations, and, depending on the CAPSET, can 
be erected and operational in six to eight hours (Headquarters USMC, Combat 
Development and Integration, 2011).  
c. COC Mobile Capability 
The COC can provide the commander with tactical or “jump” capability. A 
jump COC allows the commander and staff to be physically removed from the 
main COC while maintaining some of the same capabilities. This allows the 
commander to insert himself at the point of friction to provide effective C2. The 
use of wheeled or tracked vehicles is typically required to ensure the commander 
can move and communicate simultaneously. This mobility also enables the jump 
COC to assume C2 responsibilities, allowing the main COC to be packed up and 
moved (Liguori & Daniel, 2013). The COC was not designed to provide the jump 
with mirrored main-COC communication architecture or for distribution to units 
smaller than a BN, MAG, or MWSS. 
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 The COC is a SoS that integrates and interfaces to an array of systems 
and equipment that can be organized according to the MAGTF C2 capability 
model.  
d. Tactical Data Systems 
According to Headquarters USMC, Combat Development and Integration 
(2011), the COC hosts TDS and applications and the JTCW software, providing 
the commander with tools to maintain SA, plan, make decisions, direct units, and 
monitor execution, enabling the integration of systems (see system relationships 
in Appendix A). The COC itself does not manage the TDS or application data, as 
shown in Appendix A; it simply provides hosting, storage, a user interface, and a 
display.  
However, the COC program does provide a core set of service capabilities 
to hosted applications and TDSs; these include the enterprise services that allow 
the COC to provide access and deliver information to the global information grid 
(GIG). The COC does not directly connect to the GIG or provide services across 
the USMC enterprise, and the COC is dependent on the availability and 
capability of the transmission system (Headquarters USMC, Combat 
Development and Integration, 2011). 
2. The Networking-on-the-Move (NOTM) System 
With continuous military operations in austere environments and the need 
to extend C2 beyond VHF range, commanders require the ability to rapidly 
engage the enemy while OTM. This means leveraging the C2 capabilities 
provided by the COC.  NOTM, which is a system combining a variety of COTS, 
was approved to meet the emergent need identified by COCOMs via an urgent 
UNS (classified) request. 
The NOTM system is described as a transformational C2 capability for all 
elements of the MAGTF (USMC Concepts and Programs, 2013). It is a self-
forming, self-healing, mobile, ad-hoc, tactical-communications network. This 
 31 
means the NOTM system does not require a nearby established infrastructure to 
operate, and it can be decentralized, self-organizing, and set to automatically 
reconfigure without human intervention in the event of degraded or broken links 
between transceivers. This provides units with the ability to have uninterrupted 
C2 while en route to an AO—and once they arrive, C2 is instantaneous. 
Providing the warfighter with an integrated voice, video, and data enables real-
time C2 with OTM, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS), and over-the-horizon (OTH) 
communication (MARCORSYSCOM, 2012). These capabilities help the 
COCOM, or any small-unit leader, exercise C2 in a dynamic environment. Figure 
7 depicts the MACORSYSCOM (2014)-advertised topography of the NOTM 
network. 
 
Figure 7.  NOTM System Overview, Subsystem connectivity 
(from MARCORSYSCOM, 2014). 
a. NOTM Provided Systems  
According to MARCORSYSCOM (2014) the NOTM is a vehicle-based C2 
system that provides COC capability to commanders and their staff while OTM or 
at-the-halt (ATH). This is achieved via an OTM SATCOM system and three 
external network enclaves (SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and mission specific). The 
NOTM system is predicted to provide the following systems to units: 
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• A point of presence (POP) A POP mounted on a host vehicle 
platform acts as the primary hub for mounted and dismounted users 
and bridges mobile users operating OTM to the network. POP provides 
SATCOM, LOS, and wireless radio-frequency, data-network, and 
communication-security (COMSEC) equipment within the host 
platform. The POP also hosts a video server, allowing direct video 
feeds. 
• Staff vehicle kits (SVKs) Mounted on vehicles, SVKs provide users 
with extension nodes. The SVK hosts the mobile user’s laptops and 
handheld devices and provides network connectivity and access to C2 
applications through the POP to the ATH network. The SVK consists of 
LOS, wireless devices, and data-network equipment. 
• NOTM staff kits (SKs) are for the dismounted user and provide an 
extension kit for LOS or wireless connectivity from laptop and handheld 
devices to the SVK or POP, via LOS or wireless technology. 
The NOTM system suite currently consists of three tactical vehicles, with 
one equipped with the POP components and the other two equipped with the 
SVK components. This provides an extension of POP-Vs services, allowing for a 
further dispersion of C2. The system allows the extension of services to 
dismounted units by means of a communications man-pack component. 
Depicted in Figure 8, are the POP-V, SVK, SK, and tactical entry-point (TEP) 
modem-kit equipment set. The TEP modem is a stationary kit that provides the 
termination of the satellite downlink integrated with a support wide-area network 
(SWAN) version-3 terminal or a very small-aperture terminal–large (VSAT-L) at 
the COC’s location (MARCORSYSCOM, 2014).  
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Figure 8.  NOTM System Suite: HMMWV/M-ATV 
(from MARCORSYSCOM, 2014). 
b. VSAT-L  
The purpose of the SWAN-D/VSAT is to enable USMC intra-theater 
communications, allow forward-deployed elements to break the terrestrial line-of-
sight tether (to extend their operations farther from their higher-echelon 
command), or to enable operations in terrain not conducive to line-of-sight (LOS) 
operations. 
c. NOTM Major Components  
To provide the COCOM with COC-like capabilities on the move, the 
NOTM is equipped with a variety of COTS technology. MARCORSYSCOM 
(2014) identifies the NOTM system and subsystem’s major COTS components 
and their characteristics. 
The point-of-presence vehicle consists of the following major 
components per asset and is considered the hub of this communication suite. 
The network topography of the POP-V is depicted in Figure 9. The POP-V kit 
consists of the following equipment: 
• Ku-Band (12-18 KHz) SATCOM 
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• Video Scout 
• AN/PRC-117G using adaptive networking wideband waveform- 2 
(ANW). 
• Fortress ES820 data radio (802.11a,b and g) 
• DTECH ruggedized network models (bc router, switch, network 
enclaves) 
• MPM-1000 (NCW) ruggedized modem:  
• Tactical Operations Center Intercommunications (TOCNET) system 
Soft CAU Interface 
• Antenna plane, antennas 
• Shore power module connection 
• Admin workstation with KVM 
The staff vehicle kit consists of the following equipment per vehicle: 
• AN/VRC-114 utilizing ANW2 
• Fortress ES820 data radio (802.11a) 
• Secure network (SECNET) 54 in-line encrypter 
• Antenna plane  
The staff kit consists of the following equipment per bag: 
• Panasonic Toughbook CF-19 
• Talon (KOV-26) card 
• TOCNET soft CAU interface 
• Ancillaries: webcam, cables 




The tactical entry-point modem kit consists of the following: 
• MPM–1000 (NCW) ruggedized modem  
• CISCO 2901 BC router  
• Network enclaves  
• PACSTAR WAN accelerator 
• Workstation CF-19 (Toughbook) 
 
Figure 9.  Point-of-Presence Vehicle Network 
(from MARCORSYSCOM, 2014). 
d. Tactical Data Systems  
According to MARCORSYSCOM (2014), the NOTM’s POP-V and SKs 
host the JTCW software. The JTCW software provides the COCOM with the 
tools needed to maintain SA, make decisions, direct units, share information, and 
monitor execution at the scene (see Appendix E for a list of JTCW software). The 
POP-V itself does not manage the JTCW or the application data, as explained in 
Appendix E; it simply provides hosting, storage, user interface and display 
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capabilities. The JTCW software should be installed via a USB or Ethernet 
interface prior to deployment, as the time required for installation via the Ku band 
would put a vehicle out of service for a significant duration.  
The POP-V delivers a core set of service capabilities to hosted 
applications and TDSs; these include enterprise services that allow the NOTM to 
offer access and delivery of information to the COC. The NOTM does not directly 
connect to the GIG or provide services across the USMC enterprise. It transmits 
information to and from the COC via satellite and depends on the availability and 
capability of the transmission system, located at the COC, (MARCORSYSCOM, 
2014) for the sharing of information. 
The NOTM comprising the above-identified COTS equipment provides an 
OTM C2 capability that allows the COCOM to extend C2 beyond the range of 
VHF. With this system, the COCOM can pursue the enemy as rapidly as a 
vehicle can travel, without the risk of losing communication with subordinate, 
adjacent, or higher units. Providing a COCOM with a self-forming, self-healing 
communications network allows for redundancy in areas where the 
communication infrastructure has been destroyed or did not exist. This capability 
can potentially fill the communications gap identified by the USMC. 
3. Fuel Consumption  
There still remains the need to reduce power/fuel consumption (power and 
fuel are used interchangeably). Manipulating power requirements affects fuel 
consumption; thus, this research evaluates the power requirements of 
communications assets to find ways to conserve. By decreasing consumption, 
the USMC can reduce logistics without degrading C2 and can presumably limit 
the threat to logistical convoys.  
Vehicles conducting logistical resupply are constantly subjected to threats 
on the road. Reducing fuel consumption at the edge will reduce the number of 
MTVR vehicles providing support, thus reducing both threat and fuel 
consumption. The MTVR currently consumes 50% of all ground fuel used by the 
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USMC (Kelly et al., 2011), so the more vehicles that are off the road, the less fuel 
consumed.  
a. COC CAPSET IV Fuel Consumption 
As previously discussed, the COC CAPSET IV is primarily considered an 
ATH C2 asset, with the capability of providing a mobile jump COC.  Organic to 
the COC are two M1152A1 HMMWVs and two generators that power the main 
COC and antenna hill. Table 1 provides the characteristics of a M1152A1 
HMMWV, according to TM 1103-OR (2012). By evaluating the CAPSET IV power 
requirement, one can gauge fuel consumption and compare results with similar 
assets.  
As designed, the two M1152A1 HMMWVs have specific tasks. Their 
primary task is to transport CAPSET IV components during deployment; their 
secondary is to conduct mobile jump COC operations. Once erected, it is 
possible to operate a COC without using the HMMWVs, thus reducing overall 
fuel consumption; however, this option would eliminate the jump capability. 
According to the USMC TM 11033-OR (2012), data listed in Table 1, the 
M1152A1 can achieve ten miles per gallon (MPG). This data is calculated on a 
vehicle with no payload. However, adding the CAPSET IV’s complete payload of 
12,705 pounds (per Appendix G) decreases the achievable MPG range (exact 
data not available). 
Figure 10 indicates the power consumption of the CAPSET IV proper in 
kilowatts (kW) according to iGov (2013). A kW is approximately 1.34 horsepower. 
When analyzing the total power requirements for the CAPSET IV with the organic 
20 kW generator, rate of fuel consumption is calculated to be approximately 4.58 
gallons per hour, based on an estimated fuel consumption rate for a 20 kW 




Width 87 in. (221 cm) 
Height  76.25 in. (193 cm) 
Length 194 in. (493 cm) 
Vehicle Curb Weight 7,100 lbs. (3,221 kg) 
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating  12,100 lbs. (5,493 kg) 
Vehicle Payload (including Crew) 3,340 lbs (1,515 kg) 
Cruising Range 250 miles (402 km) 
Alternator  400 ampere 
Voltage 28 Volts  
Battery Two, 12 volt (800 CCA ea. At -18 
degrees F [-28 degrees C] 
Fuel Tank 25 Gallons (94.6 Litters) 
Table 1.   M1152A1 HMMWV Technical Specifications from the USMC 
TM 11033-OR (2012). 
 
Figure 10.  CAPSET IV Total Power Requirement (from iGov, 2013). 
b. NOTM Fuel Consumption 
The NOTM suite, unlike the CAPSET IV, is dependent on tactical vehicles 
throughout deployment. There are a variety of tactical vehicle types in which the 
NOTM suite can be installed (e.g., Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV), 
HMMWVs, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles (MRAP) and M-ATVs) 
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(MARCORSYSCOM, 2014); however, this study evaluates the fuel consumption 
of the NOTM suite installed in a HMMWV and M-ATV, as these are the vehicles 
in which NOTM suites are currently installed. Table 2 provides the characteristics 
of the 1162A1 HMMWV (USMC TM 11033-OR, 2012) and Table 3 provides the 
characteristics of the M-ATV (USMC TM 11803A-OI, 2013).  
ITEM SPECIFICATIONS 
Width 87 in. (221 cm) 
Height  76.25 in. (193 cm) 
Length 194 in. (493 cm) 
Vehicle Curb Weight 7,230 lbs. (3,279 kg) 
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating  12,100 lbs. (5,493 kg) 
Vehicle Payload (including Crew) 2.230 lbs. (1,012 kg) 
Cruising Range 250 miles (402 km) 
Alternator  400 ampere 
Voltage 28 Volts  
Battery Two, 12 volt (800 CCA ea. At -18 
degrees F [-28 degrees C] 
Fuel Tank 25 Gallons (94.6 Litters) 
Table 2.   M1165A1 HMMWV Technical Specifications According to 
USMC TM 11033-OR (2012). 
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ITEM SPECIFICATION 
Width 98.0 in. (284.9 cm) 
Height  108.9 in. (276.6 cm) 
Length 265.1 in. (673.4 cm) 
Vehicle Curb Weight 28,500 lbs. (12,940 kg) 
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating  37,000 lbs. (16,798 kg) 
Cruising Range 320 miles (515 km) 
Alternator  570 amp 
Voltage 24 volts with 12 volt accessory 
provision in capsule 
Battery Four, 12 volt (800 CCA ea. At -18 
degrees F [-28 degrees C] 
Fuel Tank 47 Gallons (177.9 Litters) 
Table 3.   M-ATV Technical Specifications According to USMC TM 
11803A-OI (2013). 
According to TM 11033-OR (2012) data listed in Table 2, the M1165A1 
can achieve 10 MPG. This data is calculated on a vehicle with a zero payload. 
With SVK components installed, the payload increases by 620 pounds (USMC 
TM 12272A-OR/1, 2013) and decreases the achievable MPG (exact data not 
available). In regard to M-ATV capability, the data listed in Table 3 indicates that 
the M-ATV can achieve 6.8 MPG.  This data was calculated on a vehicle with 
zero payload.  With POP-V components installed, the payload increases by 
1,330 pounds (USMC TM 12271A-OR/1, 2013) and decreases the achievable 
MPG (exact data not available). 
In conclusion, the USMC requires a communications asset that can be 
pushed down to the lowest unit levels operating in an expeditionary environment 
at the tactical edge. It is apparent that with increased C2 capabilities, there is an 
increase in fuel requirement. Fueling these C2 capabilities is increasing the 
burden on logistical trains. To maintain operational capability, the USMC is 
placing more vehicles on the road to resupply units. In so doing, they are 
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simultaneously increasing overall fuel consumption within the service and placing 
more Marines at risk of roadside attack.  To break this chain, the USMC needs to 
explore other communications technologies.    
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IV. DESIGN MODELS, APPLICATIONS, AND COMPARISONS 
This chapter introduces a proposed virtual architecture for an 
expeditionary C2 system to support units operating at the edge. In previous 
chapters, system architectures were analyzed to ascertain compliance with 
MAGTF requirements and user needs. This chapter analyzes the past EOC field 
experiments conducted by NPS faculty with the Monterey County FRC. The 
results of the field experiments and salient characteristics of the EOC led to the 
development of an enhanced EOC called EOC-2. In this research, the models 
were compared with existing USMC systems for possible development of a new 
system. The results were used to evaluate whether the EOC models could 
support small units at the edge. This chapter concludes with a theoretical VM 
architecture that could potentially support MAGTF expeditionary requirements. 
A. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS  
1. Systems Interoperability 
As the USMC returns to its expeditionary roots, it is imperative that 
forward-deployed and tactical-edge units have a C2 architecture that supports 
the JTCW suite of software (see Appendix E) while at the same time reducing 
power consumption. The JTCW suite will ensure that the unit’s common 
operating picture is synchronized and integrated.  The COCOM’s requirement 
that SA be informed by data gathered throughout the battlefield means heavy 
reliance on units to push information to higher headquarters rapidly. This 
information is quickly analyzed, categorized, and displayed via various software 
products (e.g., CPOF and Adobe Reader—see list in Appendix E) to the COCOM 
and adjacent and subordinate units to draw a common operational picture. Any 
communications architecture designed for small units must be able to support 
JTCW software to access and process collaborative information and reach-back 
support from higher or adjacent units. This requires the communications 
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architecture to be interoperable both physically and logically with the already 
established USMC communications architecture and equipment (Ibatuan, 2013).  
The ability to support the JTCW suite does not necessarily mean small 
units operating at the edge will be required to leverage all aspects of the software 
simultaneously or have mirror capabilities of the COC in terms of bandwidth and 
speed; it does mean that the interoperability with current systems must be 
achieved to transfer data and voice. A major challenge in communications 
architecture is establishing secure links for transmitting classified information.    
2. Security 
As the USMC explores COTS technology, it is important to ensure these 
COTS systems meet DOD security parameters. NIPRNET, SIPRNET and 
CENTRIX information must be accessible without danger of compromising or 
spilling information within these networks. According to Hale and Nicely with the 
Committee on National Security Systems (2013), spillage is the transfer of 
classified or sensitive information to unaccredited and unauthorized information 
systems, applications, or media. A data spill indicates classified or sensitive 
information that is stored on or transmitted over information systems or networks 
that are: 
• Not formally accredited to host or process that information (e.g., secret 
information to the NIPRNET 
• Not formally accredited to host or process information subject to 
specific restricted handling caveats (e.g., NATO) 
• Not formally accredited to host or process information under the control 
of a particular dissemination-control system 
• The inappropriate release of information to a foreign nation 
COTS technologies will need firewalls and anti-virus programs, as well as 
the ability to operate with approved National Security Agency (NSA) encryption 
devices. Encryption is the process of obscuring information to make it unreadable 
without special knowledge (Kessel & Goodwin, 2005). According to Kessel and 
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Goodwin (2005), encryption is the primary means of securing traffic on a 
network. Valid traffic needs encryption to protect the CIA of each packet. The 
USMC to ensure information is properly encrypted before dissemination currently 
deploys a number of devices.  
a. SECNET-54 Radio Module 
The Harris Corporation (2013) describes the SECNET-54 radio module 
(RMOD) with its secure, wireless, local-area network (SWLAN) technology as a 
device that provides secure wireless data, video, and VoIP capabilities. The 
SECNET-54 is NSA-certified for 802.11a/b/g application, due to its ability to 
provide type 1, layer 2 (using the RMOD), and layer-3 SWLAN encryption to 
secure data and network header information for all network layers. The entire 
packet is encrypted, which prevents adversaries from gaining information from 
intercepted traffic analysis. SECNET-54 provides secure communications up to 
the level of top secret/sensitive, compartmented information (TS/SCI) and 
significantly reduces the bulk of externally wired encryption equipment. SECNET-
54 capabilities include virtual private network (VPN) with network address-
translation traversal (NAT-T), permitting unfettered operations in COTS 
equipment. It also includes virtual local-area network (VLAN) tag pass-through 
without the use of generic routing-encapsulation (GRE) tunnels. It can be 
configured to allow individual laptops to communicate with each other without an 
accompanying network infrastructure. Wireless bridges can be used to transmit 
secure data up to ten miles with the use of external antennas and amplifiers.  
This capability significantly increases usefulness and application in tactical 
environments when data can be secured over extended ranges (Harris 
Corporation, 2013). Figure 11 provides a look at the SECNET-54. 
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Figure 11.  SECNET-54 Cryptographic Module and Radio Module (from 
Harris Corporation, 2013).  
b. KOV-26 Talon Card  
The L-3 Communication Systems–East Corporation (2013) identifies the 
Talon card as an NSA-approved type-I encryptor that allows data access to a 
level of TS/SCI. It is designed as a multi-interface, high-assurance, internet-
protocol encryption (HAIPE) device in a Personal Computer Memory Card 
International Association (PCMCIA) form factor (Marshburn, 2011). It can provide 
classified data communications via an 802.11b/g, wired Ethernet, V.90 modem, 
or an RS-232 connection (L3 Communications Corporation, 2013). According to 
L3 (2013), the Talon is the smallest encryptor used by dismounted units, 
weighing only three ounces and offering flexible technology that can be used in 
an off-the-shelf laptop. It provides voice and data interoperability with other 
encryption devices, including legacy devices.  Figure 12 depicts the components 
of the KOV-26 Talon card. 
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Figure 12.  KOV-26 Talon Card Components (from L3 Communications 
Corporation, 2013). 
The KOV-26 Talon card accommodates up to fifteen users per card; this 
can be one user per card on fifteen configured laptops, fifteen users on one 
laptop, or a combination not to exceed fifteen (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
C2, Communications and Intelligence, 1997). 
c. Suite B 
According to the NSA (2013), the secure sharing of information among 
DOD and coalition forces down to the tactical level is important, and a method to 
protect classified information must be established. The software would have to 
be an interoperable cryptographic product that can be widely disseminated and 
uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which protects national-security 
information systems and the information within these systems. 
Suite B is part of the NSA’s cryptographic interoperability strategy, which 
has been proven sufficiently protective of unclassified and classified information, 
up to the secret level (Law & Solinas, 2011). Most data disseminated in the 
battlefield is classified at secret or below (Marshburn, 2011), which makes a 
Suite B-equipped device suitable for use (NSA 2010) within the USMC. This 
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technology allows layered use of COTS technologies and removes the stringent 
handling and accountability requirements for type-I controlled cryptographic items 
(CCI). Since this software provides for layered use of COTS technologies, 
installing it with current or future COTS products would not be a problem.  
B. EOC EXPERIMENTS 
Barreto (2011) conducted several experiments to validate the EOC as a 
concept for the Monterey Country FRC. Table 4 identifies the date, location, and 
title of the experiments. The EOC experiments were conducted in controlled 
environments, measuring setup time; software interoperability and power draw 
for the evaluation of alternative power sources. 
Date Experiment Location Event 
9/23/2011 1 Monterey, CA  Earthquake Drill 
9/24 – 9/25/2011 2 & 3 Salinas, CA California 
International Air 
Show 
Undocumented 4 San Francisco, CA Fleet Week 
9/13/2011 5 NPS, Monterey CA Faculty Event 
9/20/2011 6 NPS, Monterey CA Army Civil Affairs 
School visitation 
Table 4.   Experiment Matrix for EOC.  
While these experiments were conducted during various times in 2011, 
most of the data gathered (e.g., regarding interoperability of software and power 
draw) remains relative to the research of an EMOC model. This is owing to the 
EOC’s compatibility with software operating on Microsoft Windows or an Intel 
architecture, which is commonly used by the USMC (see appendixes A and E for 
a list of computer-ware). The two aspects that we explore are the power draw 
and dimensions (system size and weight). These are important evaluation 
parameters for the development and deployment of an expeditionary model. By 
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reducing power draw, which equates to fuel consumption, we can potentially 
reduce the logistical requirements needed to sustain the equipment. It is also the 
goal of future models to ensure that dimensions compare with the U.S. Military 
Standards 1472 F (1989) for the physical characteristics of objects handled by 
military personnel.  These standards, developed by the Military Standard Human 
Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities 
(1989), define the optimal object for lifting as “an object with uniform mass 
distribution and a compact size not exceeding 46-cm/18.11-in high, 46-cm/18.11-
in wide and 30-cm/11.8-in deep (away from the lifter)”, (p. 139). This is important 
because personnel will most likely move the EMOC manually.  
Table 5 identifies the weight and idle power draw per component (Chapter 
1, Section C, describes the functions of these components). As shown in Table 5, 
the total weight of the EOC is above the 174-pound ideal limit for a two-man L-
L&C, as defined by the Standard 1472F (1989).  




SKB Roto Rack 1 NA 66.75 lbs. 
V3 STRAT 100 
Server 
1 Left P/S/ 100.15 




1  20.27 5 lbs. 
Cisco WRT400N 
Router 
1 Outside PDU Measuring 
range, relative < 1 Watt 
< 1 lbs. 
Raritan PX PDU 1 NA 5.6 lbs. 
TRIPP-LITT B021-
000-19 KVM 
1 18.25 40 lbs. 
APC 750VA/480 
UPS 
1  12.95 41 lbs. 
Coraid SRX3500 
SAN 
1 650 Watts 
(Manufacturer’s Claim) 
55 lbs. 
Total with and 
without Coraid SAN 
8 244.48 (w/out) 
894.40 (with) 
188.45 lbs. (w/out) 
244.35 lbs. (with) 
Table 5.   Component Quantity, Idle Power Draw, and Weight of EOC.  
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The experiments by Barreto (2011) provided in Table 4 demonstrate that 
the concept of the EOC as an operations center for first responders is viable. The 
EOC met the compatibility and interoperability requirements of the FRC’s current 
software and hardware systems and proved reliable and mobile; however, the 
system’s energy efficiency was not thoroughly measured. The ability to deploy 
the EOC rapidly in under two hours was demonstrated in all experiments. 
Deployment in regard to these experiments consists of unloading the EOC 
container (Figure 13) and alternative power sources (Figure 14), booting up the 
system, and establishing a connection via a mobile satellite terminal (e.g., 
ViaSat, BGAN). These experiments also validated Barreto’s (2011) assumption 
that by relying on a VM infrastructure versus a complete physical infrastructure, 
the EOC could operate successfully on less power (W/h) than a complete 
physical system and increase command-center mobility without reducing network 
performance. It is important to note that the EOC was not fully load tested in any 
of the experiments in Table 4. The power-draw measurements were derived 
under normal operations with a maximum of three users accessing the network 
at one time. 
The Table 4 experiments taught several lessons in the area of software 
configuration based on FRC requirements, which this thesis does not visit 
because FRC requirements do not match those of the USMC (see software and 
hardware requirements in appendixes A and E). The specific alternative power 
sources used during the experiments are also not evaluated. The non-tactical 
alternative power sources (Solar Stik and a Honda EU2000i Generator) used 
were not a viable solution for military operations in austere environments, due to 
non-compliance with tactical standards.  By providing the EOC operational power 
requirements derived from the experiments, the military can evaluate which 




Figure 13.  EOC Transit Case (from Barreto, 2011).  
 
Figure 14.  Solar Stik Breeze 100 (from Barreto, 2011). 
1. Exploring Results and Finding 
a. Configurations  
In validating the EOC concept, it was discovered that the VM 
configurations in regard to the Internet protocol (IP), Internet gateway access, 
and the domain-name server (DNS) were improperly configured. The EOC’s 
infrastructure depends on a reliable DNS, which by design has at least two 
networks internally, based on the VM infrastructure. The first network is used to 
communicate to the physical server(s) that runs the VM hypervisor software and 
uses a static-IP addressing scheme. The second network also uses static IP for 
the actual virtual infrastructure (in this case the Microsoft windows server); 
however, the virtual-desktop machines use dynamic host-configuration protocol 
(DHCP) for addressing. This became an issue during deployment, as the EOC 
was originally configured to support the FRC using the NPS network only. The 
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NPS network provided the system with a non-routable private IP address 
scheme, which subsequently assigned the server a static IP address from the 
available private IP addresses. Once the system was deployed and attempted to 
gain access to an outside network via a non-NPS-networked satellite, the IP 
address scheme originally assigned to the system was invalidated and failed to 
register to the new network. This prevented the EOC from pulling services from 
any satellite. 
To solve this problem, a Cisco Wireless-N dual-band router was added, 
allowing the router to serve as both the internal and external gateway and 
provide an external DNS, DHCP, and wireless authentication, as well as user 
authentication for the DNS and active directory (AD) to the VM infrastructure. 
This allowed the EOC to issue a pool of IP addresses properly throughout the 
network.  
b. Power Consumption  
The power consumption of the EOC during these experiments fluctuated 
depending on the number of users (maximized at three) accessing the server 
and the laptops drawing power from the system.  Consumption ranged from a 
low of 229.0 W/h to a high of 267.188 W/h without the SAN component installed. 
With the SAN component installed, the power draw was elevated by 640 W/h. 
During the experiments, the power requirement spiked to 907.188 W/h with the 
SAN installed. The SAN, as previously stated, provides the EOC with an 
additional storage capacity of 12 TBs. The added weight and power consumption 
of the SAN was found to outweigh its potential benefits, thus rendering it 
excessive and unnecessary (Barreto, 2011). Upon removing the SAN 
component, power consumption (minus 640 W/h) and weight (-55 lbs.), were 
reduced significantly. This modification will be implemented in all future EOC 
models, beginning with EOC-2. Figure 15 depicts the power consumption of the 
EOC per experiment (Table 4) measured in W/h with the assistance of the 
Raritan Power IQ software dashboard (Barreto, 2011).  These measurements are 
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presented with and without the SAN component for comparison value. Note: 
there are no data measuring power consumption for Experiment 6 (Army Civil 
Affairs). 
  
Figure 15.  EOC Power Consumption in W/h during Experiments.  
It is important to note during the experiments identified in Table 4 that the 
EOC was not exploited to its full service potential, as the main purpose of the 
experiments was to validate the concept of the system. The EOC was not load 
tested with a large number of users connected to the network. Without 
conducting a load test on the EOC, it is difficult to gauge power consumption 
during a realistic deployment evolution. The lack of data based on a system-load 
test skews the power-draw results in Figure 15. This is something to evaluate in 
a future model.   
C. THE INTRODUCTION OF EOC MODEL TWO  
With the validation of the EOC concept and the presentation of the results 
and finding, work began on EOC-2, which would maintain the same 
communications capabilities as the EOC, in terms of VM functions and 
networking capabilities, to accommodate the FRC’s software and hardware 
requirements. The main characteristics reviewed for reconfiguration were the 
dimensions and power draw of the original EOC architecture. An attempt was 













power draw from 244.48 W/h to 200 W/h.  Reducing the dimensions of the EOC-
2 would ensure compliance with commercial-airline standards (foreign and 
domestic) for cargo dimensions and allow a two-man team to move the system. 
1. Characteristics of the EOC-2 
The EOC-2 architecture maintains the same structural design elements as 
the original. However, based on results and findings from experiments on the 
original EOC, several components were changed. The focus of the EOC-2 model 
was not only maintaining, but also enhancing the initial criteria of robustness, 
energy efficiency, two-man portability, and integration into existing HFN 
infrastructure. Table 6 describes the characteristics and idle power draw of the 
main components used to create the EOC-2 architecture. See also the data in 
Appendix I. 
 




SKB Roto Rack 28” 1 NA 62 lbs. 
Intel Server R1000 1 Left P/S/ 3. 
Right P/S/128 
43.56 lbs. 
Cisco SGE2000P  
24 Port Switch 
1 19.00 5 lbs. 
Cradle Point 
Wireless Router  
1 Outside PDU Measuring 
range, relative < 1 Watt 
2 lbs. 






 12.95 77 lbs. 
Administrator 
Laptop  
1 .47 / 9. 8 lbs. 
 
Total w/out UPS 







    
Table 6.   EOC-2 Component Quantity, Idle Power Draw and Weight.  
By reconfiguring and replacing some of the original EOC components with 
new COTS technology, Barreto reduced dimensions and power consumption 
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without downgrading performance. The modifications were made in regard to the 
server and UPS system. Despite the implementation of new components, the 
basic functionality remains identical to the original model, although the power 
draw and dimensions were altered. 
a. Power Consumption
One of the main EOC-2 design goals was to reduce the energy 
consumption thus reducing the resupply requirement. With the new design 
configuration, the EOC-2 was tested and evaluated to measure power draw, 
using the following COTS software” 
(1) Raritan Power IQ Software 
The Raritan Power IQ software suite was chosen to measure the power 
draw of the EOC-2 in W/h, during all testing. This software worked with a Raritan 
PDU hardware system in the EOC-2. The Raritan PDU monitors the W/h 
required as the EOC-2 operates. The Raritan Power IQ software is a free 
program designed to monitor equipment power draw and distributed breakdown 
within the EOC-2 architecture. This same software was used to measure the 
power draw of the original EOC; it is commercially available from the Raritan 
Corporation (www.raritan.com). 
(2) Testing Anywhere Software 
The Testing Anywhere software suite was chosen as a way to load test 
the EOC-2 server. Load testing, for the purpose of this thesis, refers to the 
simulation of a large number of users accessing the server simultaneously to 
determine capability. The Testing Anywhere suite is a free software downloaded 
from the Testing Anywhere website (www.testinganywhere.com) and installed 
onto the EOC-2 administrator’s laptop. The software was used to simulate user 
activities on the network, allowing researchers to measure the amount of power 
the server requires to support users.  
The Raritan Power IQ software, combined with the Testing Anywhere 
suite and PDU hardware, provided adequate tools to measure the power draw of 
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the EOC-2 under simulated real-world use. With these programs installed, the 
researchers controlled the number of users accessing the network at any given 
time, thus allowing monitoring of power draw based on the quantity and activities 
of users.  
The researchers began testing by installing Microsoft Windows Server 
2008 and 2012 on the EOC-2 server. They recorded the power draw in W/h for 
the server at one-hour intervals for a range of times. To compute the average 
power draw, the researchers averaged the power draw during the time frame 
tested, which varied depending on the testing iteration. Three tests were 
conducted to measure and evaluate power draw. For these tests, the EOC-2 was 
configured to accommodate 25 virtual users. Testing allowed all 25 users to 
access the applications on the EOC-2 server network simultaneously. The 
number of virtual users was based on a standard-size USMC infantry platoon, 
per MARCORSYSCOM (2013), and the limitations of the testing software.  
All testing was conducted in the Virtual Cloud Lab located in Root Hall on 
the NPS campus, which is climate controlled to cool other servers not included in 
this research. This allowed the EOC-2 server’s cooling system to operate at a 
constant 2.35 W/h. To compensate for the artificial cooling of the testing facility, 
the researchers added an additional 14.45 W/h, derived from the manufacture’s 
published system configurations. These configurations accounted for the cooling 
system’s maximum power draw of 16.80 W/h. The researchers deducted the 
normal operating power draw of 2.35 WPH (recorded by the PDU) from the 
maximum power draw published by the manufacture (16.80 W/h), which equaled 
14.45 W/h.  
Before the experiments, the power draw was taken from the EOC-2 in a 
standby state. For this research, “standby state” means the EOC-2 is powered on 
with zero user activity present. The baseline measurement was taken (in watts) 
using the Raritan Power IQ software over a 24-hour period, for a result of 152.93 
W/h. All graphs of the three tests conducted represent the baseline of 152.93 
W/h, and the minimum, maximum and projected power drawn based on the 
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cooling system operating at max capacity (14.45 W/h) for the duration of a given 
test. 
In preparation for the tests, the Testing Anywhere software was configured 
with the parameters in Table 7.  These indicate the number of simulated users 
accessing the server’s various applications and the number of instances in which 
they occur. An instance, for the purpose of this study, refers to a user’s random 
access of any of the following applications: 
• Email  
• SQL databases  
• Web servers  
• Network components  
• Applications (i.e., Windows)  
• Other installed software 
The instances were scheduled to occur continuously during two 12-hour and one 
24-hour period. These timeframes were chosen to simulate high user server 
demand.  
Experiment Total Users Total Instances Time Frame 
One 25 10,000 12-Hours 
Two 25 10,000 12-Hours 
Three 25 10,000 24-Hours 
Table 7.   Defined Parameters For EOC-2 Experiments. 
After testing in accordance with the parameters identified in Table 7, the 
following results were observed and recorded:  
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Experiment One: The power draw fluctuated between the baseline power 
draw of 152.93 W/h to a maximum power draw of 218-W/h and 232.35 W/h, 
incorporating the continuous operation of the cooling system as identified in 
Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16.  EOC-2 Experiment One: Base Line, Minimum, Maximum and 
Projected Power Draw Due to the Cooling System.  
Experiment Two: The power draw fluctuated above the baseline power at 
167 W/h to a maximum power draw of 190-W/h and 204.45 W/h, incorporating 

















Figure 17.  EOC-2 Experiment Two: Base Line, Minimum, Maximum and 
Projected Power Draw Due to the Cooling System.  
Experiment Three: The power draw fluctuated above the baseline power 
at 167 W/h to a maximum power draw of 190-W/h and 204.45 W/h, incorporating 
the continuous operation of the cooling system as identified in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.  EOC-2 Experiment Three: Base Line, Minimum, Maximum 
and Projected Power Draw Due to the Cooling System. 
During testing the EOC-2’s power draw fluctuated between the baseline of 


























operation of the cooling system. Figures 16, 17, and 18 were generated using the 
parameters identified in Table 7 and raw data recorded using the Testing 
Anywhere and Power IQ software and the EOC-2’ PDU (see Appendix H).  
Recall that an additional 14.45 W/h was added to all totals to simulate the 
continuous operation of the server’s cooling system under torrid conditions.   
b. Dimensions 
Policies on cargo weight can vary depending on the airline and its location 
and travel destinations, whether the continental U.S. (CONUS) or outside the 
continental U.S. (OCONUS).  For the EOC-2, we focus on CONUS travel, as the 
system is designed for the CONUS FRC. For transportation of the EOC-2 within 
CONUS, one would have to comply with the weight parameters for domestic 
flights. These standards vary depending on the airline; however, the majority of 
airlines limit cargo to 100 pounds, which may be exceeded for an additional fee 
(Wikitravel, 2013). In the research, the design goal of 100 pounds reflects the 
need to ensure that the EOC-2 is manually transportable by two persons. 
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) does 
not have a standard directly related to manual L-L&C the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), has developed an equation to 
determine recommended L-L&C (U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). The equation 
determines the recommended lifting index, which provides a relative indication of 
the risk of injury associate with various L-L&C tasks. The equation does not 
predict the exact risk for injury, but does provide a guideline for the weight one 
person should lift: 51 pounds (English & Nelson, 2010). This is another guideline 
that should be used by Barreto to achieve the dimension goal of 100 lbs for the 
EOC-2. Testing for an EOC-3 is scheduled for late 2014— beyond the timeframe 
of this thesis. 
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D. AN EXPEDITIONARY MOBILE OPERATIONS CENTER (EMOC) 
With data and experimental testing of the EOC and EOC-2 completed, the 
design of an EMOC model is proposed to bridge the communications gap at the 
tactical edge. Table 8 depicts the proposed components for the EMOC design 
with the same power consumption and component weight characteristics as the 
EOC-2. Note that this research does not endorse any specific brand or 
manufacturer of COTS components; nevertheless, the design is based on 
capabilities and characteristics observed empirically by testing specific COTS 
components for the EOC-2. In theory, any component meeting the parameters 
and specifications of the equipment used during testing should produce similar 
results. Table 8 presents proposed major component and specifications for the 
EMOC. 




Ruggized Case  1 NA 62 lbs. 
Wireless Router 1 Outside PDU 
Measuring range, 




1 8 12 lbs. 
Server System  1 Left P/S/3 
Right P/S/ 128 
43.56 lbs. 
24-Port Switch 1 19.00 5 lbs. 
PDU 1 NA / NA 5.6 lbs. 
UPS 1 12.95 41 lbs. 
Total 6 160.92 171.66 lbs. 
    
 
Table 8.   Proposed Major Component and Specifications for the 
EMOC. 
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The characteristics explored for reconfiguration of the EOC-2 to comply 
with USMC requirements are as follows: security, access to multiple enclaves 
(SIPRNET, NIPRNET, CENTRIX), lightweight, and energy efficient. These areas 
were identified to accommodate MAGTF-defined capabilities of secure C2, 
compatibility with current software and hardware (as detailed in appendixes A 
and E), lightweight, mobility, and energy efficiency.  
The EOC-2 VM configurations are optimal to meet current USMC software 
and hardware systems and programs. The VM infrastructure is compatible with 
any Windows or Intel architecture, which is preferred because all software used 
in the USMC network is so based. The main research focus for reconfiguration to 
an EMOC concerns security, weight, and energy efficiency.  
1. EMOC Security 
Security is important in any network architecture, and especially for the 
USMC. Information is disseminated on one of three enclaves—SIPRNET, 
NIPRNET or CENTRIX—depending on the classification level. A benefit of 
operating within the VM architecture is the ability to partition the VM system, 
allowing multiple enclaves to operate within the same physical server and 
eliminating the need for multiple physical machines. As explained in Chapter II, 
this is accomplished through the VM hypervisor. While partitioning is a feature, 
hosting multiple enclaves on a single VM can introduce threats to the architecture 
and network clients.  
Security for the proposed EMOC architecture was explored in two ways. 
First was the capability of the architecture to protect against traditional threats, 
including malware, viruses, rogue security software, Trojan horses, malicious 
spyware, worms, botnets, and rootkits. The USMC network is configured to help 
mitigate these threats, at a minimum following the U.S. government configuration 
baseline guidance, which provides standard Win7 security configurations 
developed by many agencies (including DISA and the NSA). These basic 
configurations, combined with firewalls, anti-virus programs, monitoring software, 
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and other classified capabilities, detect, isolate, and destroy viruses and 
malicious software.  The theoretical EMOC would be protected by these 
measures, while connected to the USMC network architecture, and by 
maintaining resident anti-virus software and firewalls for added protection.  
The second security aspect explored is a threat to the physical VM 
architecture via the VMM. The two known threats to the VM architecture, 
hyperjacking and virtual machine jumping, are discussed in Chapter II.  An attack 
on a VMM allows an adversary to bypass all network defenses and infiltrate all 
partitioned sections and client machines connected to the VM architecture, 
maliciously activating network components while remaining completely 
undetected in the VM architecture. This is possible because the security 
mitigations lie above the VMM on the OS—these attacks target the VMM, located 
at the foundation of the VM.  
2. EMOC Characteristics  
In designing the EMOC, the software and hardware requirements of the 
USMC, EOC-2 design and capabilities concepts, and U.S. Military Standard 
1472F (1989) were used as a guide. With the computerware requirements met 
using the server system, we focused on meeting the dimension parameters 
identified in U.S. Military Standard 1472F (referred to as Standard 1472F 
hereafter) and energy efficiency.  
Standard 1472F sets limits on the loads to be lifted by military members, 
for incorporating into the design of new equipment. The standard sets a 
maximum load of 174.16-pounds for a two-man L-L&C. Standard 1472F (1989) 
also identifies the optimal object for lifting, with the assumption that it has 
handles that are located at half the object’s height and 5.9-inches away from the 
lifter, consisting of “an object with uniform mass distribution and a compact size 
not exceeding 18.11-in high, 18.11-in wide and 11.8-in deep (away from the 
lifter)”, (p. 139). In addition to meeting Standard 1472F, the researchers wished 
to meet cargo restrictions in commercial transportation, including aircraft, ground 
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vehicles, and vessels. Currently, commercial air transportation allows for cargo 
up to 200 pounds for military personnel (Wikitravel, 2013), which the EOC fails to 
meet at its current weight. Restrictions that can hinder transportation of an 
EMOC also exist with some military aircraft (e.g., helicopters) and naval vessels. 
Thus the proposed EMOC components were researched with weight goals in 
mind.  
a. Ruggedized Case 
The proposed container for the EMOC is a 4U ruggedized case similar to 
that used for the EOC container (a SKB 24-inch 4U Roto Shock Rack). The 
container provides appropriate shock resistance and measures 27.5-in x 36.75-in 
x 17-in (length x width x height). Although the width presented exceeds Standard 
1472F’s 18.11-in by 18.64-in, for a total of 36.75, the benefits of the case 
override this concern for the researchers. Increasing the width of the ruggedized 
case by 18.64-in allows the system to maintain all its components together in one 
case, rather than spread among multiple cases. In addition, the overall weight of 
the system comes in below the 174 pounds of L-L&C standards. 
b. Encryption and Wireless Access Point  
The Fortress ES820 self-healing mesh-point system by General Dynamics 
(2011) is proposed to satisfy the secure communications requirement for the 
EMOC and converts the EMOC into a SWLAN. The Fortress ES820 is currently 
used by the USMC with the NOTM suite and has proven reliable 
(MARCORSYSCOM, 2014). The Fortress’ ability to provide secure wireless 
communications using AES-CTR-128/192/256, AES-GCM-128/256, AES-CCM-
128, WPA2 (802.11i), and IPsec (Suite B and Legacy) encryption standards 
provides it with capabilities similar to the current NOTM suite, as regards wireless 
access for mesh clients (laptops, tablets, etc.) and secure communication with 
the USMC network. It also provides the units with flexible maneuverability and a 
smaller footprint in the expeditionary environment. The Fortress functions as both 
a wireless access point and a network bridge. Designed as a lightweight and 
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rugged component with a maximum power draw of 12-W/h (General Dynamics, 
2011) it complements the proposed design of the EMOC. This asset enables the 
unit to form a network spontaneously without preexisting infrastructure, which 
can potentially save time. 
c. Server System 
The server system, which was also used in the EOC-2, is a 1U rack-
mounted server that combines performance and power efficiency. It contains 128 
GBs of RAM, sufficient memory for the execution of the VMware configuration 
supporting the Microsoft Windows AD infrastructure, VMs, and other applications 
on the server. This amount of RAM has been demonstrated to support between 
25 and 50 VM clients, depending on the RAM allocated to each machine by an 
administrator. Based on industry standards, a typical 64-bit Windows 7 VM is 
allocated 3 GB of RAM. This provides enough RAM for partitioning the VM to 
handle multiple enclaves (i.e. SIPRNET, NIPRNET and CENTRIX) and OSs 
(Windows, Linux, etc.), reducing the unit footprint by limiting the number of 
servers required. 
This research proposes that the EMOC configuration contain a server 
system similar to the EOC’s, ensuring maximal computing power. To help 
increase storage capabilities and allow COCOMs flexibility in the allocation of 
local and host data, or applications on the server, it is recommended that the 
server be outfitted with eight TBs of SSD local storage. This provides scalability 
to the server, allowing an increase or decrease of RAM, depending on mission 
requirements. Similar to the EOC, the proposed EMOC utilizes a VMware ESX or 
ESXi, for which the USMC already owns licensing privileges. The proposed 
EMOC architecture includes VMware View and an ESX server as well as the AD, 
DNS, and other systems that support user authentication, machine identification 
and validation, and security. This architecture is designed to support up to 50 
virtual desktops, accessible through a variety of media (tablets, smartphones, 
thin clients, zero clients, laptops, etc.) running Windows, Macintosh, or Linux 
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OSs and providing units at the edge with a complete virtualized environment that 
mirrors the COC.  
d. 24-Port Gigabit PoE Switch 
A 24-port gigabit PoE switch is proposed for the EMOC configuration as a 
redundant method of connecting to the EMOC network. The preferred method of 
gaining access to the network in an expeditionary environment is through the 
wireless access point associated with the EMOC architecture. This method 
allows a decreased footprint by eliminating the need for Ethernet cabling. 
However, by adding the 24-port gigabit PoE switch, the COCOM maintains the 
option of having computers connect to the EMOC via Ethernet cable. This can 
prove beneficial if the COCOM plans to operate in a fixed position for a 
prolonged period and the footprint size is irrelevant or the wireless access point 
is degraded. Adding a switch to the EMOC architecture would allow 24 
computers to connect directly via Ethernet.    
e. Power-Distribution Unit 
The proposed EMOC configuration maintains the EOC’s PDU component, 
which lets personnel measure the power consumption of the system with 
accuracy. This can be beneficial in analyzing which devices use the most power 
and which systems can be condensed when power needs to be conserved. The 
PDU also manages the power outlets by allowing the shutdown of unused 
outlets. This feature prevents prohibited items, such as phones and coffee pots, 
from drawing power from the EMOC. The PDU also reduces the load on the 
power system during the booting cycle by allowing power outlets to be staged on 
and off. The current PDU in the EOC-2 is compact, which allows the PDU and 
the switch to share a single slot, thus maximizing space in the container. 
f. Uninterrupted Power Supply 
The proposed EMOC architecture includes a UPS system similar to that 
found in the EOC, but removed from the EOC-2. The EOC has an APC SMART 
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UPS 750 mounted in the ruggedized case, which provides 750 watts of backup 
power. The EOC-2 contains a detached 1000 watt SMART UPS, providing an 
additional 250 watts of protection. The tradeoff is the backup unit’s removal from 
the ruggedized container and separate housing in its own case (Figure 19), due 
to its larger size. The benefit is that the COCOM can deploy the EOC-2 with or 
without the UPS component.  
Nevertheless, this research proposes that an internal UPS be housed 
within the EMOC ruggedized case. The risk of power threats and the stakes of 
C2 are too high to allow the option of not having an UPS; the EMOC should 
never be deployed without one. If additional UPS services are required, the 
COCOM can attach a separate component to the architecture via an outside 
case, such as that displayed in Figure 19. 
The dimensional benefit of removing the internal UPS from the EMOC 
architecture does not outweigh the potential cost of power failure.  Additionally, 
by incorporating new COTS UPS technology (for example, the Cyber Power 
system) the EMOC can maintain an internal 1000-watt UPS without significantly 
increasing weight.  
  
Figure 19.  Tactical Power UPS with Ruggedized Case. 
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g. Energy Efficiency  
The proposed EMOC architecture is designed to reduce power 
consumption by units operating at the tactical edge without degrading C2 
capabilities. The EOC was used as a baseline due to the success of Barreto 
(2011) in reducing power draw and its use of alternative power sources (wind 
and solar). As currently designed, the EOC’s power requirements range from 
894.4 W/h (with SAN) to 244.48 W/h (without SAN). The EOC-2 tested has a 
lower power requirement than the original EOC, fluctuating between the baseline 
of 152.93 to a maximum 218 W/h and 232.35 W/h, incorporating the continuous 
operation of the cooling system as identified in figures 15, 16, and 17. The 
EMOC concept was created to significantly reduce the power draw of a C2 
system while meeting USMC needs, thus reducing the fuel needed to operate the 
system. By reducing the fuel consumption of the EMOC architecture, a unit can 
potentially reduce the logistical requirement associated with refueling its location. 
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V. FINDING, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The findings of this research as they pertain to the research questions, 
recommendations, and a conclusion are presented in this chapter. 
1. Research Question One 
The first research question was, how could the current EOC-in-a-box 
architecture be modified to reduce weight, improve maneuverability, and still 
provide the security and C2 capabilities needed to bridge the communications 
gap? 
a. Weight and Maneuverability 
Redesigning the EOC’s architecture to reduce weight and improve 
maneuverability is theoretically achieved in the EMOC system design. The 
modifications, identified in Chapter IV, are based on the original EOC models and 
EOC-2. The proposed new components for an EMOC model reduce the original 
EOC architecture from 244 pounds to 159.66 pounds, comfortably below the 
174-pound Standard 1472F maximum recommendation for two-man L-L&C. The 
weight reduction afforded by this configuration is intended to assist the 
maneuverability of the system. However, since the EMOC is a theoretical design, 
measurement of system maneuverability in practice is difficult. 
b. Security  
The EOC concept as currently designed is not a viable option to solve the 
USMC’s identified communication gap, failing to satisfy the MARCORSYSCOM 
(2012) MAGTF C2 characteristics of interoperability and trust, both in its 
capabilities and the validity of the information made available. 
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The EOC’s center of gravity is its reliance on virtualization to perform 
communications and reduce weight and energy consumption, which it effectively 
accomplishes; however, this virtualization aspect of the EOC is also its critical 
vulnerability. There is an identified vulnerability in the virtualization of OSs and 
server partitioning that allows the running of multiple enclaves. This research 
brings to light the critical vulnerabilities present within the VM hypervisor, which 
permit a sophisticated adversary to attack the VM without detection, allowing 
access to all operating systems within the VM. Since the hypervisor operates 
beneath the OS layer, it may be vulnerable to hyperjacking and virtual machine 
jumping as well—severely compromising network security and data.  
Another shortfall in the EOC is that any network architecture presented as 
a solution to the USMC communications gap must facilitate all three network 
enclaves currently used by USMC units: SIPRNET, NIPRNET and CENTRIX. 
Adding encryption devices to the EOC architecture might in theory support these 
enclaves, but not with the level of security required by the NSA.  
Two factors hinder the EOC from supporting these enclaves: first, VM 
architecture vulnerability via the hypervisor. The hypervisor vulnerability can 
potentially allow an adversary access to one or all of the network enclaves, 
allowing classified information stored in the VM to be compromised. Second, is 
the “one server” architecture concept of the EOC. As designed, the EOC 
architecture contains only one server, which in theory would be partitioned to 
support classified and unclassified networks. Owing to this design, the EOC 
architecture fails to meet the NSA and USMC’s policy on the physical and logical 
separation, or air-gapping, of different classifications of networks (classified and 
unclassified). Air gapping is defined by Technopedia (2014) as: 
A security measure implemented for computers, computer systems 
or networks requiring airtight security without the risk of 
compromise or disaster. It ensures total isolation of a given system 
electromagnetically, electronically, and, most importantly physically 
from other networks, especially those that are not secure. 
(Technopedia, 2014, para. 1) 
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Since all networks would be housed on one server there is the potential 
for classified or sensitive information to be leaked from a classified to an 
unclassified network. One way to mitigate this vulnerability would be to install 
another server in the architecture. This would allow air gapping of the NIPRNET 
and SIPRNET; however, it would require a larger ruggedized case for the 
additional server, thus increasing the overall weight of the system by roughly 44 
pounds. The weight of the EMOC system would increase from 159.66 pounds to 
203.66 pounds, pushing it well beyond Standard 1472F’s recommended two-man 
L-L&C weight of 174 pounds.  
c. C2 Capabilities  
EOC architecture can physically and logically support all USMC software 
and hardware requirements identified in appendix A and E—but not in 
accordance with NSA and USMC security policies. Due to the EOC’s inability to 
meet the NSA and USMC policy on physical and logical separation of classified 
and unclassified networks, it does not meet accreditation parameters for 
operating the software and hardware identified. Some of the software and 
hardware programs identified in appendixes A and E are required to operate on 
various classified and unclassified networks, depending on function. Since the 
EOC as designed would only be accredited to accommodate one enclave, 
supporting the computerware identified is not feasible. Units deploying the EOC 
concept at the edge, with access to just one enclave (either SIPRNET, NIPRNET 
or CENTRIX) would not be ideally served, as their communications capability 
would be limited.  
2. Research Question Two: 
How can the EOC-in-a-box’s energy-efficiency plan be modified to reduce 
the logistical burden associated with C2? 
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a. Energy Efficiency 
Underestimating power consumption poses a number of risks. If usage 
exceeds circuit capacity, users run the risk of tripping a circuit breaker and losing 
power. Users also run the risk of exhausting their fuel supply prematurely, which 
places an undue burden on logistical units having to resupply them. The key to 
reducing these problems is deploying assets that are energy efficient and 
capable of satisfying user requirements. By employing energy-efficient assets, 
the logistical burden can theoretically be reduced and the opportunity to leverage 
alternative-energy-producing technology can be enhanced. In evaluating IT 
equipment for energy efficiency, it is important to consider the environmental 
conditions in which the equipment will be used. These considerations range from 
the climate to user activities and may have a huge impact on the power draw of 
the equipment. 
The EOC is considered energy efficient, with a power-draw range of 
244.48 to 894.40 W/h (Barreto, 2011). This low power requirement allows the 
use of solar panels and wind turbines (Barreto 2011) to contribute to operating 
power. Testing and evaluation of the EOC-2’s power requirements reveals a 
power-draw requirement ranging from 152.93 to 218 W/h, below the minimum 
range of the original EOC’s low point of 244.48 W/h. Taking into consideration 
the climate-controlled environment in which testing occurred for the EOC-2, the 
researchers calculated the W/h associated with an EOC-2 cooling system 
operating continuously. Factoring in manufacturer specifications, this estimation 
added 14.45 W/h for a maximum power draw of 232.45 W/h. With the additional 
W/h, the EOC-2 still falls below the original EOC’s low point of 244.48 W/h.  
The EOC-2’s testing parameters were more stringent than the parameters 
followed during the testing of the EOC, because the original EOC’s testing 
focused on proving the concept. The EOC-2 followed the parameters identified in 
Chapter IV, Table 7, which called for power draw to be measured with 25 virtual 
users simultaneously accessing the server. This further validates that the EOC-
2’s energy efficiency is enhanced as compared to the original EOC. If the 
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proposed EMOC model is built with components similar to those in the EOC-2, 
this research suggests it will produce results similar to the EOC-2.  
A. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
There were several limitations encountered during this study. The EMOC 
as described in Chapter IV is a theoretical architecture, based on the 
documented performance of the original EOC (EOC-1) by Barreto (2011) and 
evaluations and testing of the EOC-2 concept. The EOC-1 is owned and 
operated by Monterey Country First Responders and could not be made 
available to the researcher for the purposes of this thesis. We were constrained 
to rely on past research and assistance from the creator of the EOC concept. 
Past experiments were documented and cataloged in the areas of dimension and 
functional concept, which provided a solid background and quantitative data for 
comparing EOC-1 and EOC-2 for the development of the theoretical EMOC 
architecture. EOC-1 research did not thoroughly measure or document the power 
draw of the system with a large number of users. This forced this research to rely 
on the power measurements of the EOC-2 model only; but we believe that the 
measurements from the EOC-2 are sufficient to propose an EMOC model, due to 
the quality of the experiments conducted. 
Owing to the lack of CCI (i.e. SECNET 54, KG 175) and security software 
(Suite B) the EOC-2 was unable to be outfitted with the appropriate 
computerware. This prevented us from fully testing the ability of the EOC-2 to 
accept and operate with CCI material.  Based on the documented requirements 
of the security software and hardware, it is theorized that the EOC-2, and by 
extension the EMOC, would in fact be able to support the software and hardware 
of these security applications. It is also important to note that the EMOC’s 
proposed design meets the manufacturer specifications for the installation of the 
security software and hardware.  
Testing of the functionality of the JTCW software and the COC’s tactical-
data systems on the EOC-2 was not conducted, due to lack of the CCI 
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equipment needed to operate the classified software and an inability to acquire 
the non-classified software. The research for the theoretical compatibility of 
software programs for the proposed EMOC design, as identified in appendixes A 
and E, was based on the program’s OS and the ability of EOC-2 to support such 
programs. As the software identified in appendixes A and E is based on the 
Windows and Linus OS, the EOC-2 was tested for compatibility and operational 
constraints in functioning with these OS. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In conducting this research, we identified several areas that were either 
out of scope or acting as limitations to assumptions—these should be analyzed 
in future research. Nevertheless, this research concludes that the EOC concept 
as designed cannot solve the USMC communications gap at the tactical edge. 
Further research is recommended in assisting the deployment of the EOC 
concept for the FRC. 
Tactical Alternative-Energy-Producing Technology 
Several government agencies are evaluating alternative-energy 
technology to deploy in austere environments to reduce the consumption of fossil 
fuels. Once these technologies (for example, solar panels and wind turbines) are 
identified and refined, evaluating the EMOC under these power sources may 
assist in further reducing the need for fossil fuels. 
Tactical Vehicle Installation 
As designed, the EMOC is not configured as an on-the-move architecture. 
The two limiting factors are its power and transmission (satellite) requirements. 
The theoretical EMOC draws power via a NEMA 5 connector—an AC-power plug 
with a three-wire grounding device (hot–neutral–ground) rated for 125 V 
maximum, with a standard three-prong cable. This research recommends that a 
prototype EMOC be configured to draw power from a vehicle using the NATO 
plug receptacle located in many emergency-response vehicles, shown in Figure 
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20. This would allow the EMOC to be OTM-capable when operated in a FRC
vehicle configured with a transmission terminal. 
Figure 20.  Mini NATO Plug (from Military Battery Systems, 2014). 
Hypervisor Security Vulnerability 
As previously highlighted, there are security concerns within any virtual 
machine operating a hypervisor. Further research needs to be conducted on 
ways to mitigate potential vulnerabilities within the hypervisor, specifically as 
relates to the threat of virtual machine jumping and hyperjacking. These threats 
are fairly new to the virtual environment and are only theorized as a threat, but 
the potential damage would devastate a network, and the problem should be 
investigated. The idea of an adversary infiltrating a network undetected is cause 
for alarm, and with this potential vulnerability present in virtual-machines, 
deploying this type of technology without extensive research is irresponsible. 
Extreme-Temperature Evaluation 
The FRC can be forced to operate in various climes and terrains during a 
disaster; thus it is necessary that gear be functional in austere environments. The 
EOC and the EOC-2 were designed and tested in and around Northern California 
under ideal weather conditions. This limited the evaluation of the EOC concept 
for operations in extreme cold and heat. Further research should be conducted 
on the effects of temperature extremes on the EOC system to determine how it 
will function in adverse conditions. 
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A. CONCLUSIONS 
This research explores a viable solution to the USMC’s communications 
gap at the tactical edge. The aim is to leverage COTS technology to provide 
COC-like communication architecture to small units operating in austere 
environments. The proposed architecture required must be lightweight, energy 
efficient and allow greater mobility through a reduced footprint and energy 
consumption. By reducing the energy required for unit communications, this 
theoretical architecture decreases fuel needs, leading to a reduction in logistical-
supply requirements.  
The EOC architectural concept is examined as an example of virtualized 
technology, to determine how such an architecture might satisfy USMC 
requirements. Server virtualization, HFNs, the functionality of software and 
hardware in a virtual environment, and the original concept of the EOC 
architecture are explored. Expeditionary considerations and MAGTF C2 
characteristics are also considered, along with current communication 
architectures, comparing capabilities, weight, and power consumption to 
determine a baseline for future C2 technology. Finally, the interoperability and 
security of the EOC are discussed in relation to software and hardware used by 
the USMC.  
Experiments and analysis were conducted on the EOC and EOC-2 for the 
propose of designing an EMOC communication architecture for use by the 
USMC, with components, functions, weight and power requirements described. 
The research suggests that while the EOC concept is not a compatible option for 
USMC implementation, the EMOC is theoretically viable. 
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APPENDIX A. SYSTEM RELATIONSHIPS 
The table below outlines the most commonly used systems and 
equipment used by the operating forces within the COC (Headquarters USMC, 
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Table 9.   Systems and Equipment Used by the Operating Forces 
within the COC (Headquarters USMC, Combat Development 
and Integration, 2011). 
 
 82 
APPENDIX B. COC CAPSET IV COMPONENTS LIST 
The table below identifies the major components of the CAPSET IV 
(Headquarters USMC, Combat Development and Integration, 2011). 
 
Table 10.   Major Components of the CAPSET IV (Headquarters USMC, 
Combat Development and Integration, 2011). 
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APPENDIX C. CAPSET IV, PDU POWER CIRCUITS 
The below table identifies the CAPSET IV Component’s power 
consumption as monitored by in-line ammeters (Headquarters USMC, Combat 
Development and Integration, 2011). 
 
Table 11.   CAPSET IV Component’s Power Consumption as Monitored 
by In-Line Ammeters (Headquarters USMC, Combat 
Development and Integration, 2011). 
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APPENDIX D. COC CAPSET IV IT EQUIPMENT 
The table below identifies the type and quantity of the IT equipment for a 
COC CAPSET IV (Headquarters USMC, Combat Development and Integration, 
2011).  
 
Table 12.   IT Equipment for a COC CAPSET IV (Headquarters USMC, 
Combat Development and Integration, 2011).  
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APPENDIX E. JTCW SOFTWARE 
The table below identifies the Joint Tactical Common Workstation (JTCW) 
software associated with the NOTM system suite (MARCORSYSCOM, 2014). 
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Table 13.   JTCW software (MARCORSYSCOM, 2014). 
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APPENDIX F. APPROXIMATE FUEL CONSUMPTION FOR DIESEL 
GENERATORS 
This chart approximates the fuel consumption of a diesel generator, based 
on the size of the generator and the load at which the generator is operating.  
 
Table 14.   Approximate Fuel Consumption of a Diesel Generator. 
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APPENDIX G. CAPSET IV TECHNICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Below is a chart depicting the characteristics of a CAPSET IV, according 
to TM 2000-OD/2C. 
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APPENDIX H. EXPERIMENTAL DATA 




Table 16.   Raw Measurements of All Experiments Conducted on the 
EOC-2. 
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APPENDIX I. EOC-2 IDLE POWER DRAW 
The screen shot below presents the idle power draw of the EOC-2 
according to the systems Raritan PDU.  
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